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I. INTRODUCTION: MEN WITH NO REGRETS AND
INADEQUATE CONCERN
“It just doesn’t smell right.”
1

Brent D. Benjamin, Chief Justice
2
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

Justice Benjamin proved far less sensitive to the “smell test” when his
own conduct was at issue. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,3 the
U.S. Supreme Court, albeit by a slim 5–4 vote,4 vacated a decision in
which he had received $3 million in campaign support from the CEO of

1. Audio tape: comment to policyholder counsel David A. Gauntlett, Esq. during
oral argument before West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., Appeal No. 34402, Civ. Action No. 07-C-69 (Sept. 2, 2009) (on
file with author) (reviewing trial court decision that held that insurers have no duty to
defend).
Policyholder Mylan was seeking defense pursuant to purchased advertising injury
coverage from its liability insurers in connection with a class action over alleged manipulation
of average wholesale price of its products that policyholder contended were potentially
within coverage because it involved price discrimination in marketing that allegedly
inflicted advertising injury for purposes of the insurance policy. The standard for
triggering a duty to defend is whether plaintiff’s claim creates a potential for coverage based
on facts alleged in the complaint, even if noncovered claims are also alleged. See Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156, 160 (W. Va. 1986); 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 9.03 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009). Justice Benjamin
was visibly irked at the prospect of a company’s violating the law and obtaining
insurance protection, albeit—as policyholder counsel emphasized—only for defense of
the claims (if criminal conduct were proven, then an exclusion would likely apply).
2. Although this is the court’s proper title, this Article will commonly refer to it
as the “West Virginia Supreme Court” or the “state supreme court” for ease of reference.
3. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
4. See id. at 2252. Justice Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, forming a majority to vacate the West Virginia Supreme
Court’s decision when the state court justice casting the deciding vote had received $3
million in campaign aid from the CEO of defendant Massey. Chief Justice Roberts was
joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, voting to let the decision stand in spite of
the key participation by the challenged state court justice. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2274–75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for
extending due process review to cases of judicial recusal based on campaign activity).
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a litigant seeking to avoid a $50 million liability.5 The dissenters not
only objected to removing Justice Benjamin, but also minimized the
danger of biased judging presented by the situation,6 and questioned the
wisdom of expanding review of state court judicial disqualification
pursuant to the Due Process Clause.7 Editorial comment on the decision
was largely favorable, although a significant number of commentators
embraced the dissent’s bizarre view that requiring the disqualification or

5. See infra Part II.A for a review of the facts of Caperton. According to some
estimates, Blankenship spent as much as $3.5 million on behalf of the Benjamin
candidacy. See Editorial, Clouded: State Supreme Court, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 7,
2008, at 4A (“Benjamin was elected in 2004 because Massey Energy’s CEO spent an
astounding $3.5 million to defeat Benjamin’s Democratic opponent.”). For purposes of
analyzing the disqualification issues presented, this Article will assume that Blankenship’s
campaign support was no greater than $3 million.
6. Chief Justice Roberts stated:
And why is the Court so convinced that this is an extreme case? It is true that
Don Blankenship spent a large amount of money in connection with this election.
But this point cannot be emphasized strongly enough: Other than a $1,000
direct contribution from Blankenship, [disqualified West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals] Justice [Brent] Benjamin and his campaign had no control
over how this money was spent.
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts also
found, “Moreover, Blankenship’s [$3 million in] independent expenditures do not appear
‘grossly disproportionate’ compared to other such expenditures in this very election.” Id.
Justice Scalia stated that “[t]he Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all
wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot
succeed—which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable.”
Id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. See id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (contending that the “end result [of
the majority’s decision favoring disqualification] will do far more to erode public
confidence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case”).
The Chief Justice then raises a list of specific questions regarding application of the
majority’s standards for judicial impartiality satisfying constitutional due process. Id. at
2269–72. Justice Scalia continued:
In the best of all possible worlds, should judges sometimes recuse even where
the clear commands of our prior due process law do not require it? Undoubtedly.
The relevant question, however, is whether we do more good than harm by
seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional
mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable rule. The answer is obvious.
Id. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting). More precisely, the Roberts dissent posed forty
questions in defense of its view that the majority’s invocation of the Due Process Clause
to require judicial disqualification due to receipt of enormous campaign contributions
was not a sustainably practical approach to policing the judicial integrity of state courts.
Forty enumerated questions, that is, with many containing subparts or follow-up questions. If
one calculates the total number of questions in the Roberts dissent as one would in
reviewing litigation interrogatories, the total number of questions actually totals eighty
queries. See id. at 2269–72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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recusal8 of a justice who had received so much financial aid from a
litigant somehow brought the judiciary into disrepute.9
And what of the men whose behavior prompted the relatively rare act
of U.S. Supreme Court scrutiny over the participation of a state court
justice in a case involving questions of state law? Massey Coal CEO
Don L. Blankenship, the man who had showered $3 million in support
of the justice in question, remained defiant, defending his enormous
assistance as mere civic activism:
Simply put, I helped defeat a judge [Justice Benjamin’s 2004 opponent
former Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw] who had released a pedophile
to work in a local school,10 who had driven doctors out of the state, and who

8. This Article treats the words “disqualification” and “recusal” as synonyms.
Some courts and commentators have historically distinguished the terms, suggesting that
disqualification is a judge’s mandatory obligation to avoid participation in a case while
recusal is a more voluntary, discretionary act informed by the judge’s own preferences as
well as prevailing law. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, at
4-11 (4th ed. 2007) (tending to use disqualification as preferred term but using recusal as
acceptable synonym); RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 1.1 (2d ed. 2007) (noting traditional distinction but using
terms interchangeably throughout the treatise); Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1214 (2002) (using terms
interchangeably); Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 460 (2004)
(outlining traditional distinction between the terms).
9. Compare Joan Biskupic, Court Says Judges Must Avoid Appearance of Bias
with Donors, USA TODAY, June 9, 2009, at 2A, Jess Bravin & Kris Maher, Justices Set
New Standard for Recusals, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at A3, Michael Doyle, Supreme
Court Makes It Easier To Force Elected Judges off Cases, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS,
June 9, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/257/story/69665.html, Editorial, Honest Justice,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A26 (endorsing Caperton’s removal of Justice Benjamin
from case and criticizing dissenters), and Editorial, Raising the Bar, L.A. TIMES, June 9,
2009, at A18 (favoring Caperton result), with Editorial, Judges and ‘Bias,’ WALL ST. J.,
June 9, 2009, at A18 (criticizing decision), and Editorial, Judicial Impartiality, LAS
VEGAS REV. J., June 11, 2009, at 6B (finding that the decision could cause more
problems than it solves and endangers continued election of judges by making campaign
support ground for recusal).
10. Notwithstanding that the McGraw-Benjamin election contest was over five
years ago, Blankenship remained in campaign mode, alluding to the “hot button” political
issue that appears to have been key to defeating McGraw. Along with a state supreme
court majority, McGraw had vacated the sentence of Tony Arbaugh, who at age fifteen
was convicted of molesting his younger half-brother and sentenced to thirty-five years in
jail, with the case vacated and remanded in a unanimous per curiam opinion. Arbaugh
was then given probation and later charged with drug, weapons, and domestic violence
crimes. The case was subsequently featured in anti-McGraw campaign advertisements
to imply that McGraw was soft on crime and insufficiently protective of children. See
Figure in Court Election Ads Faces Charges, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 2005, at
3A.
The Arbaugh matter was seen by many observers as a red herring tactic designed to
make McGraw look bad but mask the real political conflict in the McGraw-Benjamin
race:
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had cost workers their jobs for thirty plus years.
I think this effort helped
unchain West Virginia’s economy and benefited working families. . . .
Like millions of other Americans I contributed my time, my energy, and, yes,
my money to oppose a candidate I disagreed with personally and politically. It
is unfortunate that the Supreme Court’s ruling is being reported as a matter of
corporate influence and judicial review. This is not and was not ever about the
company I have served for more than 27 years or the industry I have worked for
the majority of my entire life.12

The race is seen by many as a proxy war between business and labor for
control of the five-member Supreme Court. The state Chamber of Commerce
spent about $850,000 on commercials critical of the court in an unsuccessful
effort to knock off McGraw in the Democratic primary.
If Benjamin wins in November, business groups believe he will vote with
the Democratic justices viewed as more business-friendly, Spike Maynard
[subsequently disqualified in Caperton because of his vacations with and other
social ties to Blankenship and later defeated by a more liberal Democrat] and
Robin Davis.
Chris Wetterich, Massey CEO Seeks Donations for McGraw Opponent, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Aug. 18, 2004, at 3A. Unquestionably, the Arbaugh case was prominent in a
campaign notable for its harsh attacks on a sitting justice. See Terry Carter, Mud and
Money: Judicial Elections Turn to Big Bucks and Nasty Tactics, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2005, at
40, 45 (noting that leading state newspaper labeled attack ads “West Virginia’s version
of Swift Boat Veterans for the Truth” (quoting Brad McElhinny, McGraw Campaign
Cries Foul: Candidate’s Team Says Independent Group Must Be Coordinating with Foe’s
Campaign Staff, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 2004, at 1A)). See also Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Playing Forty Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts’ Concerns in Caperton
and Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal and Due Process,
39 SW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing Arbaugh case and 2004 McGraw-Benjamin election
contest in greater detail).
11. In this portion of his statement, Blankenship is referring to former Justice
McGraw’s votes to uphold plaintiff tort verdicts and to strike down certain aspects of
medical malpractice tort reform legislation championed by much of the medical and
business community.
12. See Don L. Blankenship Addresses the U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, No. 08-22, PR NEWSWIRE, June 10, 2009, http://www.
prnewswire.com/news-releases/don-l-blankenship-addresses-the-us-supreme-court-ruling-oncaperton-v-at-massey-coal-company-no-08-22-62084212.html. Blankenship downplays
the corporate power aspects of the case and stresses that he was “born in Appalachia” and
has “spent almost [his] entire life as a resident of West Virginia,” issuing this statement with a
dateline of Sprigg, West Virginia. Interested readers seeking more information are instructed
to contact Chelsea Cummings at (202) 683-3106 for Don Blankenship. This is the
Washington, D.C. phone number of the McLean, Virginia-based public relations firm of
Qorvis Communications, LLC, which according to its website “specializes in corporate
communications” and includes as clients the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kurdistan
Regional Government of Iraq. See Qorvis, http://www.qorvis. com (last visited Feb. 7,
2010). So much for Blankenship’s down-home, local West Virginia boy posture in the press
release.
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Blankenship’s statement conveniently fails to mention that the
disqualified justice cast the deciding vote in a decision eliminating a $50
million judgment against Massey Coal, which had grown to
approximately $82 million with interest by summer 2009, and that the
Caperton v. Massey case was not only financially important to Massey
Coal, but also served as something of a referendum on Blankenship’s
conduct as a businessman. In the underlying litigation, a jury had
concluded that Blankenship directed Massey in predatory, deceptive,
fraudulent, unfair business practices that were designed to acquire
plaintiff Hugh Caperton’s Harman Mining Company and that had
eventually forced Caperton into bankruptcy.13 The verdict, which was to
a large degree a verdict on Blankenship and his business practices,
undermined his efforts to portray himself as a champion of a better West
Virginia.14
Justice Benjamin was more subdued but hardly contrite. He refused to
concede even the possibility that he had erred in failing to step away
from the Caperton v. Massey litigation:
It is obvious from the argument in March, the 5–4 vote of the Court, and the
diversity of opinions from the Supreme Court, that the issue in the Caperton
case was not an easy one. . . .
I am pleased that the Supreme Court has not questioned my ethics, my integrity,
or my personal impartiality or propriety. . . .
In focusing on the issue of due process, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion
recognizes that there is no “white line” to guide judges like me in resolving the
issue of an elected judge’s duty to remain on the case versus the need to remove
13. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 229–33 (W. Va. 2008)
(reviewing factual background and history of litigation), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
14. But perhaps not. Before the West Virginia Supreme Court, Massey Coal and
Blankenship succeeded in their challenge to the judgment based on the technical legal
defenses of forum selection and res judicata rather than on any appellate overturning of
adverse fact determinations on the merits of plaintiff’s claim of predatory business
behavior:
Although numerous issues have been raised on appeal in this case, we find
that the instant matter may be resolved on the issue of the forum-selection
clause contained in the 1997 CSA [coal supply agreement] between Sovereign
Coal Sales, Inc., Wellmore Coal Corporation and Harman Mining Corporation.
In the alternative, this case may be resolved based on the doctrine of res judicata.
Id. at 234. Having succeeded on the technical defenses, defendants appear not to have
expended much energy continuing to protest their innocence of plaintiffs’ charges.
Eventually, despite the forced recusal of Justice Benjamin, the technical defense of
improper forum based on a forum selection clause in a subsidiary’s contract prevailed for
Massey when the case was decided on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. See
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 107 (W. Va. Nov.
12, 2009); see also infra notes 291–92 and accompanying text. At what appears to be
the end of the day for this protracted litigation, West Virginia trial court findings of fact
highly damning of Massey remain largely unrefuted, but Massey avoids civil liability for
the sharp-elbowed tactics it deployed in gaining control of Caperton’s Harman Mine.
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oneself due to external factors. The Supreme Court’s new standard appears to
focus on the perceptions created regarding the impact on due process in a given
case caused by the activities of persons other than the judge in question.
Specifically, the Supreme Court focuses on whether there may be a risk to due
process in a case when an external party’s influence in a given situation, such as
in an election, is sufficiently substantial that it must be presumed to engender
the potential for actual bias by a judge despite there being no direct relationship
between the judge and the external party, and despite the lack of any benefit to
the judge.
This is a very fact-specific new standard. The focus of “potential for bias”
now places more due process emphasis on perceptions and independent actions
of external parties than on a judge’s actual conduct or record.15

Although less combative than Blankenship, Justice Benjamin is
essentially unrepentant over his failure to recuse—a lack of contrition
that is perhaps understandable in light of the 5–4 vote on the merits as
well as the dissents in the Supreme Court opinion. Justice Scalia’s
dissent is almost Blankenship-like in its opposition to the majority’s
recusal decision. Chief Justice Roberts authored a more measured
dissent that garnered the votes of Justices Alito and Thomas as well as
Scalia and that was nonetheless quite forgiving of Justice Benjamin.16 In
essence, both dissents found nothing amiss in Justice Benjamin’s
decision to participate in Caperton v. Massey nor did they criticize the
manner of his participation.17
This Article takes a different view. Although one hesitates to level
strong personal criticism at an individual justice who may be a perfectly

15. See Statement of Brent D. Benjamin, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Appeals
of W. Va. (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/press/benjamin_
stmt.pdf (noting that “[t]his release is personal and is not a release of the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia”). The statement continued by noting “my four-year record
of voting 81 percent of the time against Massey’s interests would now be only a part of
the factors to be balanced in a recusal consideration.” Id.; see also infra text accompanying
notes 202–09 (discussing Justice Benjamin’s voting record on other Massey matters and
his efforts to deploy this record to suggest that he was not subject to recusal in
Caperton). The justice also stated that he was:
[C]onfident that there will be a lot of posturing and politicizing about this
decision from all sides, as there has been with so many aspects of this case.
Such a response would be counter to the philosophy of removing politics from
the court, which all fair-minded people share. I would hope instead that the
decision be given a fair and sober reading, and that it be respected as all
decisions of the United States Supreme Court should be.
Statement of Brent D. Benjamin, supra.
16. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (summarizing Caperton dissents).
17. See infra Part II.G (further outlining Caperton dissents).
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likeable attorney and person18 as well as an avid amateur archaeologist,19
any extensive substantive analysis of Justice Benjamin’s behavior in
Caperton requires his condemnation. The due process issues before the
U.S. Supreme Court may have been reasonably debatable but the recusal
motion pending before Justice Benjamin was not based on a
constitutional argument—it was a straightforward request that he refrain
from participating in the case on the basis of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which requires that a jurist not participate if a reasonable
observer might question his impartiality.
Not only did Justice Benjamin clearly make the wrong decision in
electing to stay on the case, but he consistently applied the wrong legal
standard to his behavior over the course of more than three years despite
repeated opportunities to correct the error. His badly and consistently
misframed legal analysis calls into question his judicial competence, his
judicial temperament (being too emotionally invested in the issue to
view his situation with suitable dispassion), and even his integrity. In
addition to making a legal error so gross that it might not be regarded as
inadvertent, he engaged in a rearguard action of dissembling
defensiveness in response to Caperton’s disqualification motion.20
Justice Benjamin’s handling of the recusal decision and the decision
itself is so bad that it calls into question his fitness for the bench.
Notwithstanding the normal reluctance of the legal system to punish
judges for decisions rendered in their official capacity, the Benjamin

18. See Toby Coleman, Brent Benjamin, Political Unknown Runs Against McGraw’s
Record, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 2004, at 8A (describing candidate Benjamin as
a father of five, being well received on the campaign trail, and having worked as an
attorney “for a Kanawha County girl molested by a teacher”). Attorney Benjamin’s
primary practice appears to have been defense of tort and workers’ compensation claims
for the firm of Robinson & McElwee, which seems to be primarily a business, insurance,
and workers’ compensation defense firm. See Robinson & McElwee, PLLC, http://www.
ramlaw.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) (describing itself as employer advocate and
listing as clients American Electric Power, Bacardi U.S.A., Food Lion, Koch Industries,
Marathon Petroleum, Kaiser Aluminum, Georgia Pacific, and other businesses). See
Cheryl Caswell, A Rookie with a Mission: Benjamin Hopes To Unseat McGraw, Alter
Balance on High Court, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 18, 2004, at 1A. Caswell’s article
discusses Benjamin’s relatively modest middle class background in Marietta, Ohio, and
college and law school attendance at Ohio State where he played lacrosse as an
undergraduate. It further notes that “[t]he McGraw campaign also argues that Benjamin has
spent most of his legal career in Charleston, blocking workers’ compensation claims” and
wages character assassination campaigns against Justice McGraw rather than fairly
discussing their jurisprudential differences. Id.
19. See Jake Stump, Hobby Takes Justice Far: Benjamin Has Made Five Trips to
Egypt for Archaeological Photos, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 3, 2006, at 1A.
20. See infra Part III (assessing Justice Benjamin’s conduct and opinions denying
disqualification).
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performance cries out for at least some consequential discipline and
could arguably support impeachment.21 To date, unfortunately, the legal
system’s treatment of Justice Benjamin’s problematic behavior has been
a figurative shrug of the shoulders, even by the Court’s majority that
correctly ejected him from further participation in Caperton.22 Worse
yet, the Caperton dissenters have given legal and political cover to
Justice Benjamin’s shameful behavior.23
Notwithstanding the political reality that more serious consequences
for Justice Benjamin are unlikely, a strong case exists for disciplining
him. At the very least, some additional action to raise judicial
consciousness is in order. The Court’s Caperton v. Massey decision was
a huge step forward in promoting sounder judicial ethics, particularly so
in the recent era of big money in state judicial elections.24 But the

21. See infra Part IV (discussing the permissible scope of impeachment and judicial
discipline).
22. See infra Part II.H (discussing Caperton majority ruling and its efforts not to
be critical of Justice Benjamin).
23. See infra Part II.G (discussing Caperton dissents).
24. The Caperton decision has spurred renewed interest in the states for adopting
some form of rule requiring disqualification based on substantial campaign support that
might raise a reasonable question as to a judge’s impartiality. For example, in Nevada, a
state that elects its judges, the Supreme Court’s Commission on the Amendment to the
Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct had initially declined to recommend adoption of the
portion of the 2007 ABA Model Code providing for disqualification based on campaign
contributions in excess of a chosen amount. See COMM’N ON THE AMENDMENT TO THE
NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, FINAL REPORT: EVALUATION OF THE 2007 ABA
MODEL CODE, ADKT NO. 427, at 4–5 (2007). After the Caperton decision, the Nevada
Supreme Court remanded the issue to the Commission, which has promulgated a rule—
awaiting court action as of this writing—that would require disqualification if an
interested or counsel party provides more than $50,000 in campaign support to the judge
and require the judge to consider recusal under the ordinary “reasonable question as to
impartiality” standard whenever an interested party or counsel provides more than 5% of
the judge’s total campaign support. The affected parties are defined broadly to include
law firms and affiliated entities, and campaign support is defined to include in-kind assistance
as well as direct campaign contributions. See COMM’N ON THE AMENDMENT TO THE NEV.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, SUPPLEMENT TO FINAL REPORT DATED APRIL 1, 2009,
ADKT NO. 427, at 2 (2009) (following the court’s request for supplement in light of
Caperton).
Under this rule, Justice Benjamin’s disqualification in Caperton would have been
required approximately $2.95 million sooner than the limit of the Blankenship
contributions, which further suggests that Justice Benjamin is living in a dream world to
think that reasonable observers would not question his impartiality in matters impacting
Blankenship. The proposed Nevada rule was unanimously supported by the twentymember commission, chaired by the immediate past chief justice and consisting of
judges, experienced attorneys, and one law professor (full disclosure: it was me), all of
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Caperton affair also reveals the troubling tendency of our current system
to fail to hold judges sufficiently accountable for their failures to observe
the established cannons of impartiality.
Part II of this Article recaps the Caperton litigation, including the
Court’s reluctance to criticize Justice Benjamin’s outrageous decision
not to recuse. Part III takes a closer look at Justice Benjamin’s repeated
attempts to justify his continued participation in the case, demonstrating
that he erred greatly in framing and assessing the relevant legal question,
far more than he, the Court’s dissenters, and even the Court’s majority
have recognized. Part IV focuses on the range, limits, and application of
judicial discipline in response to sufficiently poor recusal performance
by judges, urging that Justice Benjamin’s extreme failure to observe
proper disqualification protocol be suitably investigated and punished.
II. CAPERTON V. MASSEY: JUDICIAL ERROR; WASTED RESOURCES;
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—AND LIGHT TREATMENT
OF THE PERPETRATOR
A. The Underlying Action
The Caperton v. Massey drama began when Hugh Caperton purchased
the Harman Mine in southwestern Virginia in 1993. The mine contained
“high-grade metallurgical coal, a hot-burning and especially pure variety
that steel mills crave to fuel the blast furnaces used to make coke needed
in their production process.”25 A.T. Massey Coal Company, led by CEO
Don L. Blankenship, wanted to acquire the Harman Mine and its highgrade coal, but Caperton was unwilling to sell. Through a series of
commercial and legal initiatives, which Caperton viewed as fraudulent
and predatory but Massey characterized as merely aggressive business,
Massey eventually drove the Harman Mining Corporation and other
Caperton corporate entities into bankruptcy.26 “Through a series of
complex, almost Byzantine transactions, including the acquisition of
Harman’s prime customer and the land surrounding the competing mine,
Massey both landlocked Harman with no road or rail access and left
Caperton without a market for his coal even if he could ship it.”27 In
whom concluded that reasonable questions as to judicial impartiality arise far sooner
than the $3 million mark.
25. See John Gibeaut, Caperton’s Coal, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2009, at 52, 52.
26. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 229–34 (W. Va. 2008)
(providing extensive background of case in opinion written by three state court justices
who ruled for Massey), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
27. Gibeaut, supra note 25, at 52; see Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 229–34.
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1998, Caperton agreed to sell the Harman Mine to Massey, but the deal
collapsed down the home stretch as Massey insisted on changes that
Caperton contended reflected bad faith and an attempt to ruin the
Caperton interests.28
Caperton’s companies—Harman Mining Corporation, Harman
Development Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc.29—filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1998, facing $25 million in claims.30 Caperton,
who had personally guaranteed $1.9 million of his companies’ debt,31
sued Massey in West Virginia,32 alleging fraud and tortious interference
with contract and obtaining a $50 million jury verdict in 2002 that
survived vigorous post-trial attack by Massey.33 The trial court rejected

28. See Gibeaut, supra note 25, at 52.
29. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 229–31 (discussing the relation of the Caperton
companies and Mr. Caperton).
30. See Brief of Appellee at 13, Caperton, 679 S.E.2d 223 (No. 33350), 2007 WL
2886509.
31. Id. The Caperton guarantees included interest on the unpaid amounts.
32. Other plaintiffs in the West Virginia action were Harman Development
Corporation, Harman Mining Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales. In addition to
Massey, other defendants in the case were Massey subsidiaries Elk Run Coal Company,
Independence Coal Company, Marfork Coal Company, Performance Coal Company, and
Massey Coal Sales Company. As in the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion, these plaintiffs
will generally be referred to as “Caperton” unless otherwise indicated. See Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
Harman Mining and Sovereign Coal also sued Wellmore, a Massey subsidiary, in
Virginia for breach of contract and bad faith in connection with Wellmore’s failure to
purchase Harman coal as promised. This was based on Massey’s assertion of a force
majeure excuse from contract performance due to the closing of an LTV Steel plant that
was Wellmore’s primary customer. According to Massey’s counsel, Harman Mining
“voluntarily withdrew” the tort claim originally pled “prior to trial in the Virginia action
with assurances that [Harman] would not later assert such a claim.” Brief of Appellant at
9, Caperton, 679 S.E.2d 223 (No. 33350), 2007 WL 2886508. The jury in the Virginia
breach of contract action rendered a jury verdict of $6 million for Harman. “The appeal
to the Virginia Supreme Court was refused on technical grounds.” Id. The parties’
dispute over the preclusive effect, if any, of the Virginia action over the West Virginia
action was perhaps the key issue before the West Virginia Supreme Court and was the
basis for Massey’s success in the case when it involved Justice Benjamin. See infra note
45 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Final Order Denying Defendants’ Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment as
a Matter of Law; Rule 50(c)/59 Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for
Remittitur, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 98-C-192 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16,
2005), 2005 WL 5679073 (denying Massey motions and awarding postjudgment interest
at a 10% annual rate from the date of August 15, 2002, judgment for Caperton).
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Massey’s new trial and remittitur motions in June 2004, and denied
Massey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in March 2005.34
B. The 2004 West Virginia Supreme Court Elections
Elections for the West Virginia Supreme Court were slated for
November 2004, with Justice Warren McGraw seeking reelection.
Massey CEO Blankenship threw his support to challenger Brent
Benjamin.35 Blankenship contributed the statutory maximum of $1000
to the Benjamin campaign committee and also donated nearly $2.5
million to a political organization named “And For The Sake Of The
Kids,” which opposed Justice McGraw and advocated Justice Benjamin’s
election.36 In addition, Blankenship spent more than $500,000 independently
on television and newspaper advertisements favoring Justice Benjamin
as well as for fundraising on behalf of Justice Benjamin.37
As the U.S. Supreme Court summarized, “Blankenship’s $3 million in
contributions were more than the total amount spent by all other
Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s
own committee. Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million
more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both
candidates combined.”38 Justice Benjamin won with slightly more than
53% of the approximately 700,000 votes cast.39 Although Justice
McGraw appears to have had some significant electoral baggage that
may have more than offset the advantage incumbents traditionally

34. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (“In March 2005, the trial court denied
Massey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.”).
35. See Elliot G. Hicks, Editorial, Merit Selection, Not Elections, Must Be How We
Choose Justices, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 2004, at 5A; Millions Spent To Defeat
Warren McGraw, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2004, at 3A; Cecil E. Roberts,
Editorial, Blankenship’s Hollow Rhetoric: His Money Defeated McGraw, Now He Must
Help Miners, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 2004, at 5A.
36. Marcia Coyle, Amici Urge Recusals in Cases of Substantial Election
Contributions, TEX. LAW., Jan. 12, 2009, at 5 (discussing how the And For The Sake Of
The Kids group worked to defeat Justice McGraw); Paul N. Nyden, They Are Not
Friends: Dinner, Campaign Reports Show Connections Between Blankenship, Benjamin,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 2009, at 1A (noting that And For the Sake Of The Kids
specialized in running negative advertisements targeting Justice McGraw).
37. See, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 4–5 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2005), available at
http://www.gavelgrab.org/wp-content/resources/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf (discussing
an advertisement opposing McGraw that accused him of letting a child rapist out of
prison and allowing him to work as a high school janitor).
38. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257 (internal citation omitted).
39. “Benjamin won. He received 382,036 votes (53.3%), and McGraw received
334,301 votes (46.7%).” Id.
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possess,40 the consensus of observers appears to be that Blankenship’s
heavy financial support was a key factor in Justice Benjamin’s
election.41
C. Review and Recusal
After the election and adjudication of post-trial motions in Caperton v.
Massey, Massey sought review of the $50 million judgment. In October
2005, Caperton sought Justice Benjamin’s recusal, which he denied in
April 2006, the first in a series of repeated rebuffed attempts to obtain
40. The dissenters in particular stressed McGraw’s perceived deficiencies as a
candidate as part of their argument that the election outcome and Benjamin’s purported
gratitude toward Blankenship could not conclusively be said to flow from Blankenship’s
massive financial support of Benjamin’s candidates. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent stated:
It is also far from clear that Blankenship’s expenditures affected the outcome
of this election. Justice Benjamin won by a comfortable 7-point margin (53.3% to
46.7%). Many observers believed that Justice Benjamin’s opponent doomed
his candidacy by giving a well-publicized speech that made several curious
allegations; this speech was described in the local media as “deeply disturbing”
and worse. Justice Benjamin’s opponent also refused to give interviews or
participate in debates. All but one of the major West Virginia newspapers endorsed
Justice Benjamin. Justice Benjamin just might have won because the voters of
West Virginia thought he would be a better judge than his opponent. Unlike
the majority, I cannot say with any degree of certainty that Blankenship “cho[se]
the judge in his own cause.” I would give the voters of West Virginia more credit
than that.
Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations to record omitted).
Justice Roberts’s assessment is at considerable odds with a substantial amount of
political science literature finding that voters are extremely ill informed in low visibility
races such as judicial elections and that advertising and campaign spending plays a
particularly pivotal role in such races. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 37, at 40
(commenting that low voting rates allow special interest groups to swing campaigns and
suggesting judicial voter guides as a solution); JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at 15–16, 22 (Jesse
Rutledge ed., 2007), available at http://www.gavelgrab.org/wp-content/resources/New
PoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf (noting trend in state judicial elections toward large
campaign expenditures and emphasis on often misleading attack ads having little to do
with substantive legal issues actually facing courts); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections
and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 18–26 (2003)
(noting that voters in judicial elections get little information and tend to make uninformed
decisions); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election
of the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35 (2003).
In addition, a review of contemporary news accounts of the hard-fought 2004 West
Virginia Supreme Court election suggests that Blankenship’s financial support translated
into an effective media campaign on behalf of the Benjamin candidacy. See sources
cited supra note 10.
41. See sources cited supra note 10.
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recusal.42 According to Justice Benjamin, “no objective information . . .
[shows] that this Justice has a bias for or against any litigant, that this
Justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this litigation, or that
this Justice will be anything but fair and impartial.”43
In November 2007, the West Virginia high court reversed the $50
million judgment against Massey in a 3–2 decision in which Justice
Benjamin joined two others for the decisive vote.44 The dissenting
justices characterized the majority’s pro-Massey opinion, based on a
forum selection clause and res judicata, as “new law” at odds with prior
court precedent, a convenient instance of law reform to assist Justice
Benjamin’s major benefactor.45
Caperton sought rehearing and more recusal motions followed, with
Caperton and Massey moving for disqualification of three of the five
justices involved in the November 2007 decision:
Photos had surfaced of [majority opinion, pro-Massey] Justice Maynard
vacationing with Blankenship in the French Riviera while the case was pending.
Justice Maynard granted Caperton’s recusal motion. On the other side Justice
Starcher granted Massey’s recusal motion, based on his public criticism of
Blankenship’s role in the 2004 elections. In his recusal memorandum Justice
Starcher urged Justice Benjamin to recuse himself as well [and characterized
Blankenship’s sociopolitical electioneering activities as a “cancer” on the West
Virginia high court].46

Justice Benjamin again refused to recuse and also rejected a third
Caperton motion for disqualification. In his capacity as acting chief
justice, he was not only free to participate in the rehearing but also
replaced the two recused justices.47 In April 2008, the West Virginia
Supreme Court again ruled 3–2 in Massey’s favor, with Justice
42. See infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the chronology
of recusal motions and Justice Benjamin’s responses).
43. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259; see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
679 S.E.2d 223, 285–86 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring) (setting
forth full Benjamin opinion refusing disqualification), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2252.
44. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 WL 4150960, at *4
(W. Va. Nov. 21, 2007), vacated, 679 S.E.2d 223.
45. The West Virginia Supreme Court’s rationale was:
[F]irst, that a forum-selection clause contained in a contract to which Massey
was not a party barred the suit in West Virginia, and, second, that res judicata
barred the suit due to an out-of-state judgment to which Massey was not a
party. Justice Starcher dissented, stating that the “majority’s opinion is morally and
legally wrong.” Justice Albright also dissented, accusing the majority
of “misapplying the law and introducing sweeping ‘new law’ into our
jurisprudence that may well come back to haunt us.”
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258 (citations to record omitted).
46. Id. (citations to record omitted).
47. Id.
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Benjamin again in the slim majority.48 The two justices appointed to the
case by Justice Benjamin split their votes.49 Again, the two-justice
dissent was strong, raising serious questions about the majority’s rulings
on the substantive law50 and complaints about Justice Benjamin’s refusal

48. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 223.
49. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
50. Id. (noting dissent’s concerns); Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 284 (Albright &
Cookman, JJ., dissenting) (“Not only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts
and existing case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was neither
honored nor served by the majority.”).
What distressed Justices Albright and Cookman was the Benjamin majority’s ruling
that the Caperton West Virginia claims were barred because of the prior Harman Mining
litigation in Virginia against Wellmore. See supra note 32. Although the West Virginia
and Virginia cases are connected by virtue of the Blankenship-Massey machinations
aimed at taking control of the Harman Mine, the cases largely involved different legal
claims and arguments, different facts and evidence, and different parties. Consequently,
only the broadest view of the “logical relationship” test for assessing res judicata would
bar the West Virginia action due to Harman’s success in the Virginia lawsuit. Further, as
Caperton argued, the controlling Virginia precedent on res judicata—applicable to the
West Virginia case via choice of law principles—purported to follow the same-lawfacts-evidence test rather than the logical relationship test. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at
265, 281–83 (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting) (citing Virginia case law on res
judicata, including Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc., 576 S.E.2d 504 (Va. 2003)). See
generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.1–.32 (5th ed. 2001)
(providing a comprehensive review of topic); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1094–97 (5th ed. 2009) (outlining established
approaches to determining res judicata). The other successful ground in Massey’s
challenge to the $50 million verdict was the assertion that a forum selection clause in a
Wellmore-Harman Mining contract controlled and that Massey, which was not a party to
that contract, had standing to enforce the clause. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 234. The
clause in question provides that:
[The Wellmore-Harman Mining] [a]greement, in all respects, shall be governed,
construed and enforced in accordance with the substantive laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. All actions brought in connection with this Agreement
shall be filed in and decided by the Circuit Court of Buchanan County,
Virginia.
Id. (second alteration in original). A full discussion of the merits of Massey’s res
judicata and forum selection arguments lies beyond the scope of this Article. However,
even a brief look at these issues suggests that the West Virginia decision favoring
Massey is open to criticism in that it takes a very, very broad view of the forum selection
clause at issue and applies a very, very broad version of the “same transaction” test for
res judicata by connecting many disparate events spread over time due to the assertedly
common thread of fractious Caperton-Massey relations and the machinations of
Blankenship. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common
Sense Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV.
LITIG. 249 (2010) (discussing procedural questions in Caperton in more detail). On
remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the West Virginia Supreme Court avoided the
weakness of Massey’s res judicata argument by focusing on a forum selection clause
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to recuse pursuant to the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Due Process Clause.51 In July 2008, Justice Benjamin issued a concurring
opinion defending the majority’s decision on the merits and his decision
to participate in the case.52
D. The Supreme Court Intervenes
Caperton successfully sought certiorari.53 By this time, the case had
become widely discussed in the media.54 It was thoroughly briefed,55
including seventeen amicus briefs, most of which supported Caperton.56

requiring litigation in Buchanan County Virginia of any disputes “connected” with a coal
purchase contract breached by Massey. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No.
33350, 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 107, at *31–80 (W. Va. Nov. 12, 2009). This case is
discussed in greater detail at the conclusion of the Article.
51. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258; see also Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 292–96
(Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring).
52. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 285–309 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring), and
infra notes 186–96 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion.
53. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d 223, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).
54. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, High Court Review Sought on Judicial Recusals,
LAW.COM, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423489061; Lawrence
Messina, Legal Groups Blast W. Va. Justice in Massey Case, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/press-3311.html; Paul J.
Nyden, ABA, Groups Urge High Court To Grant Harman Appeal, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Aug. 5, 2008, at 1A; Editorial, Too Generous, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at 8.
55. See Brief of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL
5433361. The brief was authored by counsel at prominent firms: Berthold, Tiano &
O’Dell of Charleston, West Virginia; Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, PC of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; Reed Smith, LLP, also of Pittsburgh; and Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP
of Washington, D.C., most notably former U.S. Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson.
The respondents’ brief was authored by counsel at prominent firms: Offutt Nord, PLLC
of Huntington, West Virginia; Hunton & Williams, LLP, including Lewis F. Powell III;
Mayer Brown, LLP, notably with veteran Supreme Court advocates Andrew L. Frey and
Evan M. Tager; and UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh. See Brief of Respondents,
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 216165. Caperton’s case was argued
by former U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson while Massey retained prominent
Supreme Court advocate Andrew Frey. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument,
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 8-22), 2009 WL 527723.
56. Eleven of the seventeen amicus briefs supported Caperton. Among the amici
were the American Bar Association (for Caperton); the Conference of Chief Justices
(supporting neither party but setting forth criteria for determining disqualification that
favored Caperton); “Twenty-Seven Former Chief Justices and Justices” (supporting
Caperton); Public Citizen (supporting Caperton); Committee for Economic Development
(supporting Caperton); Center for Political Accountability and Zicklin Center for Business
Ethics (supporting Caperton); Washington Appellate Lawyers Association (supporting
Caperton); American Academy of Appellate Lawyers (supporting Caperton); Justice at
Stake (supporting Caperton); Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law
(supporting Caperton); American Association for Justice (supporting Caperton); National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (supporting Caperton); Center for Competitive
Politics (supporting Massey); Professors Ronald Rotunda and Michael Dimino (supporting
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In June 2009, the Court by a 5–4 majority sided with Caperton and
vacated the decision that had reversed his $50 million judgment against
Massey.57 The Court observed:
[T]here is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable
perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by
raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total
amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on
the outcome of the election.
Applying this principle, we conclude that Blankenship’s campaign efforts had
a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the
case.58

E. Caperton’s Test for Determining When Recusal Is Required
by the Due Process Clause
The Blankenship-Benjamin situation violated the Due Process Clause,
according to the majority, in that it raised for the reasonable lay observer
the significant probability that Justice Benjamin could not be fair in
assessing such an important case implicating his sponsor Blankenship’s
finances.59 Reviewing the Court’s due process disqualification precedents,
the Court found the significant magnitude of Blankenship’s campaign
support to be uncomfortably close to the type of personal judicial
financial self-interest in past cases that had merited judicial recusal.60
The majority reviewed the key precedents and concluded they
supported recusal in Caperton.61 A line of cases extending from Tumey
v. Ohio62 in 1927 held that disqualification was required when a judge

Massey); James Madison Center for Free Speech (supporting Massey); “Ten Current and
Former Chief Justices” (supporting Massey); States of Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Utah (supporting Massey). See Stempel, supra note
50, at 261–62 & nn.47–49 (listing amicus briefs in full and discussing in more detail).
57. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267.
58. Id. at 2263–64.
59. See id. at 2264–65.
60. See id. at 2262–63.
61. See id. passim (discussing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986);
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward
v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683
(1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
62. 273 U.S. 510.
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had a “direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest”63 in a case, a
situation reflected in the longstanding Anglo-American axiom that no
person should be “allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt
his integrity,” a standard with roots in Blackstonian England.64
Operationalizing the standard in Tumey, the Court stated that when the
judge “had a financial interest in the outcome of a case, although the
interest was less than what would have been considered personal or
direct at common law,” he must recuse.65
Although the Court had not previously found due process to require
recusal due to election campaign support, the Caperton result is quite
consistent with Tumey and its progeny. For example, in the 1986 Aetna
Life Insurance v. Lavoie66 decision, the Court found that an Alabama
Supreme Court justice’s participation in a case that could set favorable
precedent for his similar suit against an insurer was the type of financial
interest that merited disqualification under the Due Process Clause.67
The Caperton majority viewed campaign financial support as something
other than the type of direct pecuniary interest that made a jurist a “judge
in his own case.”68 Nonetheless, the majority found that the Benjamin
nonrecusal fell easily within the zone of cases requiring recusal on due
process grounds. “The proper constitutional inquiry is ‘whether sitting
63. Id. at 523.
64. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James
Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961), and citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, as the seminal case in
this category). In Tumey, the village mayor sat as a judge in trying alcohol violations,
receiving extra compensation from his judicial duties that was funded by fines assessed
for conviction. The Tumey Court concluded that this presented the mayor with an
unconstitutional conflict of interest. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
65. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259–60. A second established category for which due
process-required recusal was “where a judge had no pecuniary interest in the case but
was challenged because of a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier
proceeding.” Id. at 2261. This approach has been recognized since In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, and Mayberry, 400 U.S. 455.
66. 475 U.S. 813.
67. See id. at 825. Commentators generally supported the Lavoie holding and
rationale. See, e.g., Ignazio J. Ruvolo, California’s Amendment to Canon 3E of the Code
of Judicial Conduct Requiring Self-Recusal of Disqualified Appellate Justices—Will It
Be Reversible Error Not To Self-Recuse?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 529, 551 (2003);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 640
(1987); S. Matthew Cook, Note, Extending the Due Process Clause To Prevent a
Previously Recused Judge from Later Attempting To Affect the Case from Which He Was
Recused, 1997 BYU L. REV. 423, 441–42.
68. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260–61 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at
136). Arguably, however, Justice Benjamin’s nonrecusal did violate this norm. Judges
who are not reelected lose their jobs and their income. See Stempel, supra note 50, at
267 n.64 (elaborating on this point).
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on the case then before the [court] “would offer a possible temptation to
the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear,
and true.”’”69 By this standard, Justice Benjamin’s recusal was clearly
required. The average judge presiding over a very important—$50
million, more than $80 million with accrued interest—case to a very
substantial benefactor—$3 million—would of course be tempted to be
biased in favor of the benefactor and prejudiced against his litigation
opponent.
F. Comparing the “Reasonable Question as to Impartiality”
Standard for Nonconstitutional Recusal Under Federal
and State Law to the “Serious Risk of Bias” Standard
for Constitutional Due Process Under Caperton
Whatever the merits of the contrasting Caperton majority and dissent
positions regarding due process recusal, it is important to emphasize that
Justice Benjamin was also clearly disqualified under then operative
Canon 3(E)(1) of the West Virginia and ABA Codes of Judicial
Conduct—now Rule 2.11 in the 2007 revision to the ABA Judicial
Code—in that his impartiality was subject to reasonable question. West
Virginia Canon Rule 3(E)(1) states that “[a] judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”70 Rule 29(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “[a] justice shall disqualify
himself or herself, upon proper motion or sua sponte, in accordance with
the provisions of Canon 3(E)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct or,
when sua sponte, for any other reason the justice deems appropriate.”71
69. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261 (omissions in original) (quoting Lavoie, 475 U.S.
at 825; Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); Tumey, 273 U.S. at
532).
70. See W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (West 2008), available
at http://www.state.wv.us/WVSCA/JIC/codejc.htm#Canon%203.
71. See W. VA. R. APP. P. 29(a), available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/
rules/appellate.htm#RULE%2029.%20DISQUALIFICATION, stating that:
In any proceeding, any party may file a written motion for disqualification of a
justice within thirty days after discovering the ground for disqualification and
not less than seven days prior to any scheduled proceedings in the matter. If a
motion for disqualification is not timely filed, such delay may be a factor in
deciding whether the motion should be granted.
Id. As discussed below, Justice Benjamin intimated that the Caperton parties had been
untimely in their request for his recusal, suggesting in one of his memoranda rejecting
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Current ABA Model Rule 2.11—the substance of which has been
essentially the same since the 1972 Model Code—like West Virginia
Canon 3(E)(1) provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself
in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably
questioned,”72 enumerating, as does the West Virginia rule, specific
examples of when disqualification is required.73 The ABA and adopting
recusal that the motions came almost four years after the 2004 judicial election in which
Blankenship’s money had played so large a role in Justice Benjamin’s ascension to the
bench. As also demonstrated below, Justice Benjamin’s accusation is incredible and a
little strange. It was indeed 2008 when he suggested that 2004 was too far in the past to
be relevant to a current case. But in making this assertion, Justice Benjamin
conveniently neglected to mention that the Caperton parties had been seeking his recusal
more or less continuously since October 2005 when the case first arrived on the state
supreme court’s docket and that the case remained pending in 2008 in significant part
because of all the judicial impartiality problems surrounding the court and the matter.
See infra text accompanying notes 169–70 (suggesting that this argument by Justice
Benjamin demonstrates an addled mind, lack of candor, or both).
Regardless of who is right regarding the relative timeliness of the recusal motion, Rule
29(a) makes it clear than even a tardy motion, if sufficiently persuasive, should be
granted. Delay in making the motion may at most be “a factor” in deciding the issue.
Weighed against the overwhelming case for disqualifying Justice Benjamin, any delay in
the motion, real or perceived, could not serve as legitimate grounds for him to deny the
motion.
72. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2007). See generally
FLAMM, supra note 8, § 5.5; Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding
When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 55, 57–65 (2000) (restating law and arguing for stringent standard requiring
recusal if lay observers have significant well-founded concern about judge’s impartiality);
Bassett, supra note 8, at 1223–32 (summarizing federal and state law on recusal); John
P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 43, 43–51 (1970) (describing history of judicial recusal and evolution of ABA
Model Code); Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach
to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 535–40 (2005) (summarizing federal and
state law on recusal); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic
Persistence of the Duty To Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813 (2009) (describing history of
judicial recusal and evolution of ABA Model Code).
73. Rule 2.11 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct lists the “following
circumstances” for when a judge shall recuse himself:
1. The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s
lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
2. The judge knows that the judge, the judge’s spouse or domestic partner, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse
or domestic partner of such a person is:
a. a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing
member, or trustee of a party;
b. acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
c. a person who has more than a de minimus interest that could be substantially
affected by the proceeding; or
d. likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
3. The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge’s
spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the judge’s
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states such as West Virginia have in effect stated that in the enumerated
situations, many of which seem far less troublesome than Blankenship’s
campaign support of Justice Benjamin, reasonable question as to
impartiality is a given. Impartiality is defined as the “absence of bias or
prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties,
as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may
come before a judge.”74

family residing in the judge’s household, has an economic interest in the subject
matter in controversy or is a party to the proceeding.
4. The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party’s
lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer, has within the previous [insert
number] year[s] made aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign in an
amount that is greater than $[insert amount] for an individual or $ [insert
amount] for an entity [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an entity].
5. The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement,
other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or
appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular
way in the proceeding or controversy.
6. The judge:
a. served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a
lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such
association;
b. served in government employment, and in such capacity participated personally
and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding
or has publically expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular matter in controversy;
c. was a material witness concerning the matter; or
d. previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1)–(6) (asterisks for defined terms
eliminated). The terminology section of the Model Code defines terms such as aggregate,
domestic partner, fiduciary, impartiality, “know,” and personal knowledge. Rule 2.11(B)
requires the judge to keep reasonably informed about his and his family’s financial
interests. Rule 2.11(C) permits the parties to agree to the judge’s continued participation
in the case, provided that there is no Rule 2.11(A)(1) ground for disqualification on the
basis of personal bias or prejudice toward attorney or litigant or the judge’s personal
knowledge of disputed facts. Id. R. 2.11(A)(1).
74. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 6; accord Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–79 (2002) (emphasis in original) (noting possible definitions
of impartiality, including “openmindedness,” and that the “root meaning” of impartiality
“is the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding”). The Court continued:
Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the law. That is, it
guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to him
in the same way he applies it to any other party. This is the traditional sense in
which the term is used. . . . It is also the sense in which it is used in the cases
cited by respondents [the State of Minnesota defendants] and amici for the
proposition that an impartial judge is essential to due process.
Id. at 775–76 (citations omitted).
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Case law interpreting the ABA Code’s “reasonable question regarding
impartiality” standard and equivalent language in the federal judicial
code generally views a judge as disqualified if a reasonable layperson
aware of the relevant facts would harbor significant doubt about the
judge’s ability to be impartial.75 Consequently, disqualification based on
a violation of due process as announced in Caperton is somewhat
different from disqualification under the ABA Judicial Code and state
analogues or under the general federal disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a), which in language similar to the ABA Model Code states that
“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”76 In a manner similar to the Model Code’s disqualification
provision, § 455(b) lists a number of specific instances—essentially the
same as those of the Model Code—when disqualification is required,
codifying particular circumstances that create a per se question as to a
judge’s impartiality.77
Again, as with the Model Code, the particular instances when
disqualification has been required under federal statutory law present
circumstances that, for many a reasonable observer, pose far less risk of
bias than Justice Benjamin’s receipt of $3 million in campaign aid from
the CEO of a litigant appearing before him in an important case. Put
another way, one might ask which is more troubling: Justice Benjamin’s
actual situation in Caperton or if one of his children owned $3 million of
stock in Massey? Disqualification of Justice Benjamin would have been
75. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988)
(applying this standard to disqualify federal trial judge who sat on board of university
that stood to profit from land sale if particular party prevailed in dispute over right to
build hospital); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding
that a judge faced with a disqualification motion should consider how participation in a
given case appears to the average citizen); United States v. Ferguson, 550 F. Supp. 1256,
1259–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“The issue [of impartiality] . . . is not the Court’s own
introspective capacity to sit in fair and honest judgment with respect to the controverted
issues, but whether a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts,
might fairly question the Court’s impartiality.”); see LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2d ed. 1992); ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 4.01–.13; FLAMM, supra note 8, §§ 5.6.3,
5.7; Bassett, supra note 8, at 1227; John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge
Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1987); Stempel, supra note 72, at 883–87.
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).
77. See id. § 455(b)(1)–(5) (requiring recusal in essentially the same specific
circumstances delineated in Rule 2.11 of the Model Code); see MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 2.11. Section 455(e) provides that when these enumerated grounds apply,
the parties may not agree to let the judge preside but, like Rule 2.11(C), federal law
permits the parties to waive disqualification and agree to permit the judge to preside even
if his impartiality might be subject to question. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (2006).

22

[VOL. 47: 1, 2010]

Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

required if anyone in the Benjamin family owned more than a
de minimus amount of stock in Massey.78 Yet Justice Benjamin refused
to recuse when the problem was not an attenuated investment, but
instead involved $3 million in important campaign support from the
CEO of a litigant company that needed his vote to avoid an eight-figure
liability.
Although some minor differences exist between the Model Code and
§ 455(a),79 the core standard governing a judge’s eligibility to hear and
decide cases is the same. Under the Judicial Code and § 455(a), the
reviewing court asks whether the judge’s impartiality may be reasonably
questioned. Under a due process analysis, the inquiry is similar but
disqualification is harder to obtain in that the Court’s precedents appear
to require not just reasonable question as to impartiality but also
probability of bias.80
78. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(2) (requiring recusal when
a close relative has an economic interest in a matter, with the terminology portion of the
Code defining economic interest as “ownership of more than a de minimis legal or
equitable interest” in a litigant or affected entity).
79. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 455(d) defines several key terms such as “fiduciary”
and “financial interest” in the statute itself rather than referring to a terminology section.
Regarding waiver, 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) permits the parties to agree to let a judge subject
to § 455(a) hear the case but forbids such stipulations if one of the § 455(b) grounds for
recusal applies, most of which involve financial interest of the judge or a family member.
§ 455(e). The strong federal bar to litigant consent when a judge has even modest
financial conflict is in part a legacy of now disparaged past practice in which a judge
would announce that he owned stock in a litigant company and then actively sought
litigant consent to his continued involvement, placing lawyers and parties in an awkward
position should they refuse to consent. The great Learned Hand allegedly used this
approach so regularly that the tactic acquired the name “velvet blackjack.” See JOHN P.
MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 95–117 (1974); Stempel, supra note 67, at
631 n.170.
However, federal law also differs from the Model Code in that § 455(f) specifically
provides that if “substantial judicial time has been devoted” to a case, then a § 455(b)
problem is discovered and recusal is not required “if the justice, judge, magistrate judge,
bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of
the interest that provides the grounds for disqualification.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (2006).
80. The Court has stated:
In defining these standards [for required due process recusal rather than general
disqualification] the Court has asked whether, “under a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the interest “poses such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee
of due process is to be adequately implemented.”
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009) (citing Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). The Court also drew upon Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village

23

The Caperton majority took pains not only to state that due processrequired recusal would continue to be rare but also that the standard for
due process recusal was distinctly higher than the standard for ordinary
disqualification:
“The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial
disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more
rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we find mandated here
today.” Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due
process requires, most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without
resort to the Constitution. Application of the constitutional standard implicated
in this case will thus be confined to rare instances.81

For purposes of this Article, the important point, elaborated upon in
Part III, is that the Supreme Court’s 5–4 Caperton ruling reflected a
Court split over recusal subject to the Due Process Clause. The opinion
did not address the question of recusal pursuant to the applicable state
and ABA judicial codes or federal or state statutory law. If it had, the
inevitable conclusion is that even if the question of Justice
Benjamin’s participation is a close one under the Due Process Clause, it
is not even reasonably debatable under the standard set forth in the
Judicial Code. Perhaps someone with extreme resistance to disqualification,
such as Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, could conclude that
Justice Benjamin was not actually or probably biased in favor of

of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); and
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Applied to the instant matter, the Court found:
[T]hat there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable
perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by
raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was
pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total
amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on
the outcome of the election.
Applying this principle, we conclude that Blankenship’s campaign efforts
had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on
the case.
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263–64.
81. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (quoting Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828). The Caperton
majority opinion can be properly criticized as less than crystal clear regarding the
differences between recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and the Judicial Code. At times
the opinion appears to suggest that the general “reasonable question as to impartiality”
standard used in nonconstitutional disqualification motions also governs the inquiry into
whether due process has been violated. At other junctures, the majority states that something
more—probability of bias as opposed to reasonable question of impartiality—is required
to support recusal on due process grounds as opposed to nonconstitutional recusal.
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Blankenship.82 But almost no one—except, as we shall see, Justice
Benjamin—could conclude that a reasonable observer would have no
question as to his impartiality.
Because the recusal motions filed in the West Virginia courts based
their arguments on the Judicial Code rather than the Due Process Clause,
the relevant standard for assessing Justice Benjamin’s conduct is not the
degree to which his conduct diverges from the due process recusal test
outlined by the Supreme Court in Caperton. Rather, the question is
whether Justice Benjamin’s refusal to disqualify pursuant to the Judicial
Code was defensible. As elaborated in Part IV, it was not and thus
prompts the question of whether sanctions are appropriate.
G. The Dissenters’ Defense of Justice Benjamin—
And Defective Judging
As previously noted, the issue of reaching Justice Benjamin’s failure
to recuse through the Due Process Clause divided the Court, engendering
dissents by Chief Justice Roberts—joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito83—and Justice Scalia.84 In the main, the Roberts dissent
attacked the majority approach as too indeterminate and unpredictable,85
which the dissent contended was a sufficient problem to argue in favor
of refusing to intervene in state court disqualification decisions of this
type, no matter how bad it may look to a casual newspaper reader.86

82. As discussed below, the dissenting Caperton Justices, although unduly acceptant of
Justice Benjamin’s behavior, were in the main arguing that the due process
disqualification should not reach “probability of bias” cases but should only apply if a
jurist is subject to direct pecuniary interest in a matter—with election support too
indirect to qualify—or if the jurist is both prosecutor and adjudicator over a party. See
infra Part II.G.
83. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. “At the most basic level, it is unclear whether the new probability of bias
standard is somehow limited to financial support in judicial elections, or applies to
judicial recusal questions more generally.” Id. at 2269 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent also notes “other fundamental questions as well” and lists forty
such questions, eighty questions if one counts subparts. Id. at 2269–72.
86. Chief Justice Roberts explains that:
The Court’s new “rule” provides no guidance to judges and litigants about
when recusal will be constitutionally required. This will inevitably lead to an
increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those
charges may be. The end result will do far more to erode public confidence in
judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.
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Chief Justice Roberts raised forty questions regarding the wisdom and
feasibility of the majority decision, questions that actually appear quite
susceptible to basic answers.87 Primarily, the Roberts dissent contended
that whatever benefit gained by removing Justice Benjamin from the
case is outweighed by the anticipated avalanche of less meritorious
disqualification motions that will flow from expanding due process
recusal review to include cases posing the perhaps hard to define
“serious risk of bias” issue, which will add to judicial workload and
create unfounded public concern regarding the neutrality of judges.88
Justice Scalia’s lone dissent expressed similar cost-benefit concerns in
more strident terms. Rejecting the contention that there was net benefit

Id. at 2267.
87. See Caperton Ruling May Spur States To Enhance Their Process for Judges’
Recusal, in 25 A.B.A. LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 335 (2009); see also Stempel,
supra note 10. Law professor Charles Geyh, a reporter for the 2007 ABA Model
Judicial Code, describes concerns raised in Roberts’s dissent questions as “alarmist,”
contending there is only “remote” risk of difficulties concerning the dissenters. Caperton
Ruling May Spur States To Enhance Their Process for Judges’ Recusal, supra, at 338.
Law professor Roy Schotland views the dissent’s prediction of doom as “preposterous”
but concedes that some of Roberts’s dissent questions posed reasonable questions that
may need to be answered in future cases. Id. Although precise lines cannot be drawn in
the absence of concrete cases, a series of presumptive guidelines suggest themselves for
application of due process disqualification. See Stempel, supra note 10, at 27–65.
One might also criticize the Roberts dissent for engaging in a bit of “straw man”
argumentation in that it announces an unnecessary goal—laying out an encyclopedic
view of due process qualifications that enunciates particularized rules of application for
every conceivable future dispute on the matter—and then criticizes the majority for not
meeting the dissenters’ perhaps unwise goal. In another context, judicial conservatives
like Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito might well label such a project as an
impermissible advisory opinion. A straw man is defined as “[a] tenuous and exaggerated
counterargument that an advocate puts forth for the sole purpose of disproving it.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1461 (8th ed. 2004). Having erected a straw man that is less
attractive or compelling than the actual argument opposed, the speaker then proceeds to
“knock down” this weaker target but in doing so is largely destroying something other
than the argument that was supposed to be at issue. Under the ground rules of justiciability,
courts—in particular the U.S. Supreme Court—are to refrain from rendering advisory
opinions. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12
(6th ed. 2000) (containing an overview of justiciability doctrines and general prohibition
on advisory opinions). Conservative jurists are generally viewed as particularly supportive of
this doctrine because it tends to reduce the degree to which judicial decisions may
amplify or contradict actions of the legislative or executive branch.
88. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267–73 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stressing
presumption of judicial impartiality and need to foster respect for courts as well as citing
“cautionary tale” of Court’s short-lived willingness to permit double jeopardy attacks in
civil litigation, leading to many novel claims that forced retreat on the issue and confinement
of double jeopardy issues to criminal proceedings). “[O]pening the door to [due processbased] recusal claims” based on an “amorphous ‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring our
judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the American
people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.” Id. at 2274.
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to setting aside the tainted Massey victory, Justice Scalia argued that the
majority “decision will have the opposite effect.”89 Without benefit of
any cited empirical evidence, he contended:
What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation’s judicial system
is the perception that litigation is just a game, that the party with the
most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our seemingly interminable
legal proceedings are wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering
real-world justice.90

According to Justice Scalia, the majority opinion “will reinforce that
perception, adding to the fast arsenal of lawyerly gambits what will
come to be known as the Caperton claim,”91 producing an attendant
sharp rise in disputing costs and further drain on the judicial system.92
To Justice Scalia, “[t]he relevant question . . . is whether we do more
good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through
expansion of our constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by any
discernable rule [and the] answer is obvious.”93
Perhaps to Justice Scalia. To most observers, however, Justice
Benjamin’s refusal to disqualify looks bad whether measured by the due
process standard of probable bias or the lower standard of reasonable
question as to impartiality. A New York Times editorial addressing
Caperton succinctly captures the reaction of many to the protests of the
four dissenters:
[T]he only truly alarming thing about [the Caperton] decision was that it was
not unanimous. The case drew an unusual array of friend-of-the-court briefs
from across the political spectrum, and such an extreme case about an ethical
matter that should transcend ideology should have united all nine justices.
Chief Justice Roberts is fond of likening a judge’s role to that of a baseball
umpire. It is hard to imagine that professional baseball or its fans would trust
the fairness of an umpire who accepted $3 million from one of the teams.94

89. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Justice Scalia’s dissent continued stating that:
The facts relevant to adjudicating it will have to be litigated—and likewise the
law governing it, which will be indeterminate for years to come, if not forever.
Many billable hours will be spent in poring through volumes of campaign finance
reports, and many more in contesting nonrecusal decisions through
every available means.
Id.
93.
94.

Id. at 2275.
Honest Justice, supra note 9.
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Applying the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Rule 2.11 of the
Model Judicial Code, it seems inarguable that a reasonable lay observer
would reasonably question Justice Benjamin’s ability to be impartial in
an important case involving a company headed by his seven-figure
campaign contributor. It is according to that standard that the discharge
of his judicial duties should be measured, an examination that suggests
his dereliction of judicial duty should not go unpunished.
H. Enablers: Reluctance To Criticize Justice Benjamin
As detailed below, the more one knows about Justice Benjamin’s
refusal to recuse, the worse it looks for him and the judicial system.
What could at first superficially look like simple judicial error, perhaps
committed in the heat of the moment while a case speeds along as part of
a busy docket, turns out to be an extensive record of judicial
incompetence and inappropriate behavior in which he repeatedly fails to
recognize and correct his errors. Even in his June 2009 statement
regarding the U.S. Supreme Court decision, which addressed only due
process-based recusal and not reasonable question over his impartiality,
he continues to fight a rearguard action, rationalizing his behaviors and
refusing to squarely address and admit his errors.95 One would think
such behavior would have brought substantial judicial criticism upon
him. But that appears not to be the case. Other than a few press
outlets,96 no one has been very hard on Brent Benjamin, least of all the
U.S. Supreme Court.97 Even the two dissenting state court justices in the
Caperton merits decision, who lambasted the majority’s determinations
regarding the forum selection and res judicata issues in the case,98 barely
adverted to Justice Benjamin’s more obviously erroneous decisions and
impropriety in remaining on the case and tended to pull punches in their
criticism.99
95. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (quoting Benjamin’s statement in the
wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision).
96. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text (noting comments both favorable
to U.S. Supreme Court decision and defending Benjamin’s participation in Caperton).
97. See infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (discussing how the Caperton
majority was careful not to criticize Justice Benjamin to any significant degree while the
Caperton dissenters defend his failure to recuse).
98. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 275–78, 281–84
(W. Va. 2008) (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2252.
99. The dissenting justices’ concern is confined to a footnote:
Mr. Caperton raised a further issue regarding possible disqualification of
Justice Benjamin. The majority did not address this issue, likely because it is
the practice of this Court, as it is the practice of the United States Supreme
Court and other federal courts, to leave decisions on disqualification motions
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In the U.S. Supreme Court’s Caperton majority opinion, one also sees
the impact of judicial collegiality. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion,
despite its disapproval of what happened below, takes pains to dispel any
notion that it is accusing Justice Benjamin of wrongdoing:100
Justice Benjamin was careful to address the recusal motions and explain his
reasons why, on his view of the controlling standard, disqualification was not in
order. In four separate opinions issued during the course of the appeal, he
explained why no actual bias had been established. . . . [B]ased on the facts
presented by Caperton, Justice Benjamin conducted a probing search into his
actual motives and inclinations; and he found none to be improper. We do not
question his subjective findings of impartiality and propriety. Nor do we
determine whether there was actual bias.101

In particular, the majority tries to make clear that it does not see
Justice Benjamin as having taken a bribe or having become embroiled in
a quid pro quo arrangement with benefactor Blankenship. Readers

for each judge to decide individually. Unfortunately, with true regret, we are
unable to stand silent in the present circumstances. Upon reviewing the cases
of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986), and In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), it is clear that both actual and apparent
conflicts can have due process implications on the outcome of cases affected
by such conflicts. On the record before us, we cannot say with certainty that
those cases have application here. It is now clear, especially from the last
motion for disqualification filed in this case, that there are now genuine due
process implications arising under federal law, and therefore under our law,
which have not been addressed.
Id. at 284 n.16.
The dissenters’ observation is correct but tentative and bloodless, and tends to miss the
point: regardless of the due process issues in the case, there was at all times a command
under the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E) that Justice Benjamin step
aside if a reasonable person might question his impartiality. See supra text
accompanying note 70. As detailed above, this test does not present nearly as high a
burden on the movant as does the argument that due process has been violated. The
dissenters, like Justice Benjamin himself, should simply have conceded the obvious fact
that a reasonable observer may have reasonable questions about the impartiality of a
judge who received $3 million in campaign support from an interested litigant.
Although not a dissenter in the April 2008 decision, West Virginia Justice Starcher,
who had previously recused in response to a Massey motion and addressed the issue in a
memorandum, was more implicitly critical of Benjamin but directed his ire primarily at
Blankenship whose “bestowal of his personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’
have created a cancer in the affairs of this Court.” Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258 (citing
Starcher memorandum in 2 Joint Appendix at 459a–60a, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No.
08-22), 2008 WL 5422892).
100. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262–64.
101. Id. at 2262–63. “Justice Benjamin did undertake an extensive search for actual
bias.” Id. at 2265.
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might conclude that this is merely good manners on Justice Kennedy’s
part and an aversion to kicking Justice Benjamin when he is down. But
the majority’s kid-gloves treatment of Justice Benjamin misses the mark.
Justice Benjamin’s views on disqualification under the Due Process
Clause and the serious risk of actual bias standard test applied by the
Court, although incorrect, might be defensible under the probability of
bias standard. However, Justice Benjamin was never asked to conduct a
due process disqualification inquiry. He was asked to apply the broader,
nonconstitutional standard of whether a reasonable person might
question his impartiality. As discussed above, he never correctly addressed
that question and made an indefensible error in denying disqualification
under the Judicial Code. The Caperton majority in carefully chosen words
soft-pedaled the magnitude of Justice Benjamin’s error in self-servingly
concluding that he was not actually biased because of Blankenship’s
multimillion dollar support.
The Caperton majority opinion reflects how slow jurists are to make
negative conclusions about one another. The dissenters, of course,
essentially thought Justice Benjamin did nothing wrong,102 another
illustration of the practical reluctance judges can have toward finding
error or wrongdoing in another judge’s disqualification. The majority
acknowledges, as would any reasonable observer, that $3 million is a lot
of money.103 But rather than blaming Justice Benjamin for failing to see
how receipt of such large sums made his participation in Caperton v.
Massey problematic, the Caperton majority blames Blankenship for
injecting the specter of influence peddling into judicial elections.104 “It
takes two to tango” is a cliché, but one with some bite in this situation.
Although Justice Benjamin could not prevent Blankenship individually
or Blankenship-funded special interest groups from supporting the
Benjamin candidacy, Justice Benjamin could have easily refused to
assist Blankenship in overturning a $50 million liability.
Justice Benjamin deserves more than a little scorn. Instead, even the
majority that found his participation to violate due process treated him as

102. See supra Part II.G (reviewing Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s
dissents).
103. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264 (“[Blankenship] contributions eclipsed the total
amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and exceeded by 300% the amount spent
by Benjamin’s campaign committee. Caperton claims Blankenship spent $1 million more
than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.”
(citations to record omitted)).
104. See id. at 2257–59 (directing most implicit criticism for problematic nature of
case and 2004 West Virginia Supreme Court election at Blankenship as contributor and
activist rather than at Justice Benjamin for failing to recuse).
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if his ego were made of Waterford crystal that needed gentle handling.
Worse yet, four members of the Court—Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito—defended Justice Benjamin’s grotesquely bad error
in judgment. Unfortunately, such reluctance to criticize a judge or to
implement effective recusal standards appears characteristic of the High
Court and the judiciary in general. The Court, although occasionally
providing a needed corrective when state courts fail to police judicial
neutrality,105 has not led well in this area. To begin with, the Court has
for more than 200 years set the horrible example of permitting each
Justice complete authority over his or her participation in a case. Each
Justice makes an isolated decision as to whether to disclose potential
disqualification issues to counsel and whether to recuse in a matter.
There is no review by the full Court, any panel of the Court, or any other
designated judicial or administrative body.106
Even when the Court is attempting to set forth what it regards as a
positive development regarding judicial ethics, its pronouncements have
not been particularly comforting. For example, in 1993, the Court issued
a statement regarding recusal policy when children of the Justices were
affiliated with law firms working on Court matters.107 The statement
goes no further than the bare minimum in terms of judicial ethics by
requiring recusal only if the child of a Justice is directly involved in the
case as counsel so long as the attorney-child does not directly share in
law firm revenue from the case.108 This policy, which Justices Blackmun
and Souter did not sign,109 permits the children of the Justices to
continue to have rainmaking capacity and be compensated indirectly
while allowing their parents to hear and decide cases in which they know
their attorney-children have at least an indirect professional interest and
perhaps a de facto economic interest.110 Although one sympathizes with
the Justices’ concern over strategically manufactured disqualification
105. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927).
106. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 861 n.129; infra note 259.
107. See Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court, Statement of Recusal Policy (Nov. 1,
1993), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 724–25 (2009).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 724.
110. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 913–16 (criticizing recusal statement at length).
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through law firm hiring, one also wishes the Justices had used the
opportunity to take a more expansive approach to judicial impartiality.111
In at least one case, when Justice Rehnquist refused to recuse in United
States v. Microsoft despite his son’s partnership in the law firm representing
Microsoft, the policy appears to have permitted questionable, though not
obviously improper, disqualification practice.112
Well before the issuance of the Justice’s statement, Justice Rehnquist
had perhaps set a high-water mark for improper failure to recuse by
participating in Laird v. Tatum,113 a case challenging Department of
Defense domestic civilian surveillance that had been reviewed by thenAssistant Attorney General Rehnquist, who also made statements on the
matter suggesting that he had rejected plaintiff’s claim of illegal
wiretapping well before hearing the case on the merits.114 Justice
Rehnquist violated the time-honored rule that a judge should not be a
“judge in his own case” because Rehnquist had been a participant in the
matter and would surely have been deposed had the case gone
forward.115 Adding arrogance to injury, Justice Rehnquist defended his

111. See id. (acknowledging that a stronger attitude toward recusal might inconvenience
attorney-children of justices, but concluding that this is a small price to pay for
more stringent recusal practices regarding law firm representation of litigants before the
Court).
112. See id. at 917–18 (finding question reasonably close but concluding that
Justice Rehnquist should have resolved uncertainty in favor of recusal when his son was
an equity partner in the firm representing Microsoft and was also doing antitrust work for
Microsoft regarding other matters).
113. 409 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1972) (deciding on the merits ruling that legal challenge to
Army’s domestic surveillance program was not justiciable).
114. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 851–62 (describing Laird, Rehnquist’s participation,
and public reaction, and assessing Rehnquist’s decision and finding it clearly incorrect);
accord MACKENZIE, supra note 79, at 215–17 (strongly criticizing Rehnquist’s
participation in Laird); Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 657, 682–707 (2005) (criticizing Rehnquist’s decision and rationale as
well as criticizing the Court for a lax system regarding recusal).
115. See Letter from Stephen Gillers, Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to Senator
Howard M. Metzenbaum, U.S. Senate (Sept. 4, 1986), reprinted in 132 CONG. REC.
22,592 (1986) (assessing the issue during the time when then-Justice Rehnquist was
being considered for elevation to chief justiceship, and concluding that Justice Rehnquist
had acted as a judge in his own case); accord Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Professor,
Yale Law Sch., to Senator Charles Mathias, U.S. Senate (1986), reprinted in ROBERT M.
COVER AT AL., PROCEDURE 1274 (1988) (submitting letter in connection with 1986 chief
justiceship confirmation hearings). Hazard’s letter stated that: “Mr. Rehnquist was the
responsible counsel in the matter in question, as well as a potential witness concerning
any factual issues regarding the policy. Each of these two relationships is independently
a ground for disqualification.” Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard to Senator Charles Mathias,
supra. See also Stempel, supra note 72, at 852–53 (noting Rehnquist’s personal
involvement in the case and public pronouncements suggesting predecision on the
matter).
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participation in a memorandum regarded by most commentators as
misstating the record and misanalyzing the issue.116
More recently, the public was treated to the spectacle of Justice Scalia
taking a duck hunting trip with Vice President Dick Cheney while a case
challenging Cheney’s secretive energy policy sessions was pending
before the Court.117 Justice Scalia not only participated by casting the
deciding vote 118 but also issued a defensive, arguably caustic
memorandum explaining his decision,119 further attracting criticism.120
Even more than Justice Rehnquist, who seemed genuinely torn at times

116. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (Rehnquist, J., mem.). Some of the statements in
the Rehnquist memorandum were, however, correct and the memorandum has continued
to be widely cited, primarily for its correct components but occasionally for its
problematic portions or regarding his discussion of the “duty to sit,” which was
abolished in the 1974 amendments to federal recusal law, in part as a negative reaction to
Justice Rehnquist’s conduct in Laird. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 855–63.
Professor Monroe Freedman is even more critical of Justice Rehnquist—as well as
criticizing the largely overlooked issue of Justice Breyer’s pattern of failing to recuse in
questionable cases. See Monroe H. Freedman, Judicial Impartiality in the Supreme
Court—The Troubling Case of Justice Stephen Breyer, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 513,
514 (“[Justice Rehnquist] lied in a Supreme Court memorandum opinion regarding his
failure to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum.”). Freedman also notes that Justice
Rehnquist has been “criticized for flying on a corporate jet owned by an Ohio power
plant that had dozens of cases in federal court.” Id. See also MONROE H. FREEDMAN &
ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS 231–42 (3d ed. 2004) (including an
extensive analysis of Rehnquist’s conduct related to Laird, and concluding that he
committed perjury).
117. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 900–08 (providing background on Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), and Scalia’s refusal to disqualify himself and the
attendant scholarly and law reaction).
118. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 372. See also In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir.
2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 367, remanded to 406 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
119. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.)
(denying motion to recuse).
120. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 900–08. Particularly scathing in its criticism is
Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia’s Memorandum in the Cheney
Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229 (2004) (assessing Scalia’s memorandum and finding
its analysis incorrect and unpersuasive, and concluding that Justice Scalia should have
recused himself in Cheney). However, most other commentators were similarly negative
regarding Justice Scalia’s failure to recuse, his proffered rationale, and the unrepentant
tone of his memorandum. See, e.g., David Feldman, Note, Duck Hunting, Deliberating,
and Disqualification: Cheney v. U.S. District Court and the Flaws of 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(A), 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 319 (2006); Timothy J. Goodson, Comment, Duck,
Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal Practices in the United States Supreme Court
in Light of Cheney v. United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181 (2005).
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over his situation,121 Justice Scalia expressed implicit contempt for those
who questioned his decision.122
The legal community must await access to Justice Scalia’s papers.
Justice Rehnquist’s however, reflect his brethren—and it was all
brethren at the time—supporting his decision and minimizing the
concerns of his critics. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White,
and Powell all praised his analysis and at least implicitly endorsed the
Rehnquist decision123 even though the closer examination of academic
commentators reveals great error by Justice Rehnquist in sitting on the
case.124 With informal gatekeeping like this by the Justices themselves,
there is little de facto check on the self-interested recusal decisions of the
Justices—and little wonder they were so gentle in their assessment of
Justice Benjamin’s conduct.
III. THE AUDACITY OF DENIAL: A CLOSER LOOK AT
THE BENJAMIN NONRECUSAL
Requests that Justice Benjamin remove himself from the case began in
October 2005, shortly after the case came within reach of the state

121. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 858 n.126 (noting that Justice Rehnquist in an
earlier draft of his recusal memorandum had described the question as close and that he
sought counsel from Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White—reflecting
some uncertainty over the issue and in particular whether he should issue a memorandum
explanation of his decision not to recuse). But see id. at 855 (noting that the final version
of the memorandum issued by Justice Rehnquist “was distinguished by its feisty rhetoric
and unbowed attitude”). Once having finalized his memorandum, Justice Rehnquist
almost flaunted his flaunting of proper disqualification practice. See, e.g., William H.
Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 694
(1973) (vigorously defending his memorandum and participation in Laird).
122. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 929 (Scalia, J., mem.) (“If I could have [recused] in
good conscience, I would have been pleased to demonstrate my integrity, and immediately
silence the criticism, by getting off the case. Since I believe there is no basis for recusal,
I cannot.”); see also Stempel, supra note 72, at 905–06 (noting the stridency of Scalia’s
defense of his nonrecusal and resistance to accepting idea that concern of lay observers,
particularly newspaper editorialists, was reasonable). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Justice
Rehnquist defended Justice Scalia and criticized others for their criticism of Justice Scalia.
See Gina Holland, Panel To Study Federal Judicial Ethics, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
May 26, 2004, at A10 (quoting January 2005 Rehnquist letter to U.S. Senate Democrats).
Justice Breyer also defended the Scalia nonrecusal in Cheney. See Freedman, supra
note 116, at 515. Justice Breyer’s failure to disqualify himself, both as a First Circuit
judge and a Supreme Court Justice, has also come under criticism. See id. at 515–34.
123. See Stempel, supra note 72, at 851–63; see also id. at 813 (discussing letter
from Justice Potter Stewart approving of Rehnquist’s draft memorandum and assessment); id.
at 860 n.126 (noting Justice Powell’s praising Justice Rehnquist for his “splendid
memorandum”).
124. See id. at 851–63; supra text accompanying notes 113–16.
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supreme court.125 The motions were filed by Hugh Caperton individually
and by the plaintiff Caperton companies—Harman Mining Corporation,
Harman Development Corporation, and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc.126
Both motions squarely raised the claim that participation by Justice
Benjamin would violate Canon 3(E)(1) of the West Virginia Code of
Judicial Conduct and West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 29,
which incorporates the Judicial Code’s standard that a judge must recuse
when a reasonable person might question the judge’s impartiality.127
Even prior to the case reaching the state high court, the magnitude of
the litigation and Blankenship’s support of then candidate Benjamin had
attracted attention, a fact noted in Caperton’s recusal motion, which
worried that:
[F]rom the media accounts, it appears that Justice Benjamin intends to consider
the issue subjectively: According to one published report, “Benjamin would not
promise to remove himself from any case involving Massey Energy, but he said
he would remove himself from any case in which he believed he could not be
fair. He said he thought he could be fair, though. ‘I don’t know why I wouldn’t
be,’ he said.” Exhibit F, “Benjamin knocks Warren McGraw off Supreme
Court,” Charleston Daily Mail, November 3, 2004 (emphasis provided). See
also, Exhibit G, “Benjamin May Face Bias Questions,” The Charleston Gazette,
November 4, 2004. (“Benjamin does not know if he will participate in any of
those cases [involving Massey, with specific reference made to this case]. ‘I
will have to see each case on a case-by-case basis,’ he said after promising to
recuse himself ‘from any case I don’t believe I will be fair in.’”128

125. Prior to the 2004 judicial election, however, it was obvious that the Caperton
v. Massey litigation and its large judgment would eventually reach the state supreme court.
Judgment on the compensatory damages verdict for Caperton was entered in August 2002,
with a jury award of punitive damages entered in September 2004. However, the circuit
court’s final order denying Massey post-trial motions was not entered until March 2005.
See 1 Joint Appendix at 2a, Caperton v. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22),
2008 WL 5784213. Consequently, the October 19, 2005 Caperton party motions for
Justice Benjamin’s recusal were quite timely in that petitions for appeal required for the
supreme court to hear the case would not be filed until late 2006. Regarding the process
of obtaining review before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, see W. VA. R.
APP. P. 3, available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/rules/appellate.htm#RULE%203.%
20PETITION%20FOR%20APPEAL.
126. See 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 125, at 104a, 106a, 110a, 323a (reproducing
October 19, 2005 Corporate Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin, and
October 19, 2005 Hugh Caperton’s Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin).
127. See, e.g., id. at 104a, 106a–10a (reproducing October 19, 2005 Motion of
Respondent Corporations for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin); id. at 323a, 327a–
34a (reproducing October 19, 2005 Hugh M. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification
Directed to Justice Brent D. Benjamin).
128. Id. at 329a (alteration in original) (Caperton motion to disqualify).
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As the Caperton plaintiffs correctly pointed out in their October 2005
papers submitted to Justice Benjamin and the court, the standard for
judicial disqualification under the Code is not a subjective one hinging
on the judge’s view of whether he or she is and can remain unbiased.
Rather, the clear standard as expressed both in the text of the Judicial
Code and interpretative case law is whether the mythically objective
reasonable person so frequently invoked in the law might question the
judge’s impartiality.129
The Caperton plaintiffs also invoked negative editorial comments
about Justice Benjamin’s previous refusals to recuse in Massey cases130
and additionally raised as ground for disqualification the apparent past
representation of at least one Massey entity by Justice Benjamin’s
former law firm during the time Benjamin was in practice.131 A judge’s
129. See id. at 330a–33a (Caperton motion to disqualify). The Caperton motion
cited cases and noted the existence of “more than one hundred media pieces raising the
very issue of the perceived impartiality of Justice Benjamin where Mr. Blankenship and
Massey are involved.” Id. at 331a. The motion also noted Blankenship’s central status
to the West Virginia Republican Party, of which Benjamin was nominee in the race
against McGraw. Id. See also, e.g., West Virginia ex rel. Mantz v. Zakaib, 609 S.E.2d 870
(W. Va. 2004), cited in 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 125, at 106a–08a, 113a (reproducing
October 19, 2005 Motion of Respondent Corporations for Disqualification); Tennant v.
Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 385 (W. Va. 1995) (“[T]he standard for
recusal [is] whether a reasonable and objective person knowing all the facts would
harbor doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality.”), cited in 1 Joint Appendix, supra
note 125, at 107a, 110a (reproducing October 19, 2005 Motion of Respondent
Corporations for Disqualification); FLAMM, supra note 8, §§ 5.1–.8 (deciding that
standard for recusal is an objective test asking whether an adequately informed lay
observer would harbor questions as to judge’s ability to be impartial in light of ties to
interested party or counsel).
130. 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 125, at 333a–34a (Caperton motion to disqualify).
The motion stated:
Justice Benjamin failed to disqualify himself in the coal severance tax litigation in
which a Massey Energy subsidiary is one of many named parties. As a result,
the Huntington Herald-Dispatch, which endorsed Justice Benjamin’s candidacy,
offered the following editorial opinion:
“Benjamin did not recuse himself from the case. He should have. His
impartiality is in doubt given the amount of help he received from
Blankenship’s money last year. Benjamin is part of a justice system that
relies on partisan political elections to select state Supreme Court justices,
county circuit court judges and county magistrates. Any Supreme Court
justice who accepts campaign contributions from any person, party, group
or political action committee, or who benefits from third-party help such
as Benjamin receive from Blankenship, is similarly tainted. Benjamin’s
case is more extreme than the others, but the same concern applies to all.”
Id.
131. The motion also asserted that:
In addition to the negative appearance created by Mr. Blankenship’s
massive spending in the 2004 general election campaign, there is also the issue of
Robinson & McElwee’s prior representation of Massey Defendant A.T.
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former law firm’s representation of a litigant during the time of the
judge’s practice there would itself be sufficient ground for disqualification if
the firm had worked on the same matter now pending before the court.132
Because the Massey claims handled by his former firm differ from
Massey’s defense of the Caperton claim, recusal was not required on this
basis alone, but the existence of the tie added to the list of factors
suggesting that an objectively reasonable observer would have doubts
about Benjamin’s ability to be impartial in Massey and Blankenship
cases.
All told, the Caperton motions for disqualification seem irrefutably
persuasive—unless one is willing to advance the proposition that
reasonable lay observers will not be concerned if a judge hearing a case
has received millions in support from a more or less directly interested
person.133 The motion papers correctly cite the proper legal standard,
which is a very favorable one for those seeking disqualification, and note
that a relatively reasonable set of lay observers—the news media—has
overtly questioned Justice Benjamin’s ability to be impartial. In addition,
the movants cautioned Justice Benjamin that his subjective belief in his
impartiality, even if sincere and accurate, does not permit his
participation in the case if outside observers would perceive the situation
differently.

Massey Coal Co., Inc. Specifically, it is believed that while Justice Benjamin was
still employed there, Robinson & McElwee represented A.T. Massey during the
Lady H. Coal Company, Inc. bankruptcy proceedings in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.
This historical relationship between Justice Benjamin’s prior law firm and
Massey is further complicated by the fact that Justice Benjamin is presumably
utilizing the services of Charles R. McElwee, one of the firm’s founding partners,
in a clerk capacity.
Id. at 333a (citations omitted).
132. See W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(b) (West 2008).
133. Although Blankenship was technically not a party to the case and his interest
was arguably indirect in that he would not personally be required to pay Caperton if the
trial court judgment were upheld, this seems an exercise in form over substance.
Adverse judgments against a company in the tens of millions of dollars logically imperil
and likely reduce the compensation (and perhaps even the continued employment) of the
company CEO (perhaps especially when the CEO is so personally involved in the actions
that led to the liability). Even more importantly, for all practical purposes
Blankenship is Massey, his picture and position prominently touted on the company’s
website. See Massey Energy Company, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/preview/phoenix.zhtml?
c=102864&p=irol-govBio&ID=140028 (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).

37

Although Justice Benjamin may have unwittingly mischaracterized the
legal test for recusal in off-the-cuff public comments, the Caperton
motions gave him the opportunity to research the issue, reflect, and
presumably rectify this orientation and correctly decide the motion in
favor of recusal. Or so one might have thought. But somewhat
shockingly, Justice Benjamin reiterated these errors of analysis in his
formal response to the motion. In an April 7, 2006 memorandum to the
court’s clerk, Justice Benjamin denied the motion. Although professing
to be focusing on “objective factors to believe that a given jurist will be
unable to render a fair and impartial decision in a given case,” he found
that the movants had presented:
[N]o objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias for or against
any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this litigation,
or that this Justice will be anything but fair and impartial in his consideration of
matters related to this case. What is amply present in the materials filled are
surmise, conjecture and political rhetoric.134

The justice’s memorandum establishes that he misunderstood—or did
not want to understand—what is meant by the objective test for recusal.
Instead of focusing on what outside observers would think based on their
observations (for example, $3 million in campaign support from
interested de facto party for judge deciding case important to
benefactor), Justice Benjamin instead seems to view the objective test as
a matter of whether he personally is persuaded by the motion for recusal,
notwithstanding whatever number of reporters, editorialists, or
commentators may disagree.135 In addition, Justice Benjamin appears to
focus primarily on whether he is biased or prejudiced, giving implicit
short shrift to the correct standard of impartiality.136 Even when nodding
in this direction, Justice Benjamin mangles the concept. He states that
recusal is not required because there is insufficient evidence to prove
that he would fail to be fair and impartial—but the correct inquiry is
whether observers would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Instead
of playing by the rules and correctly applying the proper standard,
Justice Benjamin imposes a burden not required by law—the burden to
prove that he cannot be impartial.137

134. 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 125, at 336a–37a (reproducing Memorandum
from Brent D. Benjamin, Chief Justice, W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals, to Rory L.
Perry, II, Clerk, W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals (Apr. 7, 2006) (discussing the case
and underlying plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify Justice Benjamin)).
135. See id.; sources cited supra note 54.
136. See 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 125, at 336a–37a.
137. Id. at 336a.
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In addition to twisted legal analysis, Justice Benjamin is openly
defensive, engaging in rather bombast rhetorical flourish accusing the
movants of employing “political rhetoric,” an irony that seems lost on
him.138 Then, in a marvelous non sequitur, Justice Benjamin devotes a
long paragraph to United States v. Haldeman,139 in which federal district
Judge John Sirica refused to cease presiding over a Watergate-related140
prosecution directed toward President Nixon’s former White House
Chief of Staff and others allegedly involved in the caper, which involved
a burglary at the Democratic Party’s national headquarters—in the
Washington, D.C. Watergate complex, hence the name of the scandal—
and other illegal efforts to disrupt President Nixon’s political foes. What
Justice Benjamin seems to have overlooked, however, is that the motion
to disqualify Judge Sirica came well into the Watergate prosecution
process and was largely directed at Judge Sirica’s prior judicial activity
rather than at any alleged extrajudicial bias toward defendants. In other
words, the judge’s alleged biases against the defendants were the
product of knowledge acquired through the judicial process itself.141
Such judicially acquired attitudes, even if eventually amounting to bias
or prejudice, are usually not grounds for recusal because they are not the
product of preconceived notions or external bias but instead result from
the judge’s assessment of the case itself.142
138. Id. at 337a (labeling recusal motion as one of “surmise, conjecture and political
rhetoric”).
139. Id. at 337a–38a (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 n.360
(D.C. Cir. 1976)).
140. See Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 52–59 (describing Watergate).
141. See id. at 132–33 (“Every complaint [defendants] register derives from judicial
acts by Judge Sirica during his tenure as the officer presiding over a series of criminal
proceedings emanating from the Watergate affair.”). In addition, the recusal motion in
Haldeman involved the version of 28 U.S.C. § 455 in existence prior to the extensive
1974 revisions that produced today’s § 455. Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit found that
“even under the appearance-of-impartiality standard” of current § 455(a), disqualification of
Judge Sirica was inappropriate because “[m]ost of the activities relied upon where
exercises of judicial functions. . . . Should the appearance-of-impropriety standard be
woodenly applied to work a judge’s disqualification because of earlier legal adjudications
entirely proper when made, the result would be truly amazing.” See id. at 133 n.297.
142. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1994); FLAMM, supra
note 8, §§ 4.1–.7. In extreme cases, a judge’s evident antipathy toward a litigant or
counsel, even if judicially acquired, may require removal of the judge from the case in
the interests of justice when the antipathy is deemed sufficiently pronounced to
jeopardize the right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81,
97–98 (3d Cir. 1992) (disqualifying trial judge in tobacco product liability case in which
judge, based on discovery controversies in case, labeled tobacco industry from
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The essence of judging is to come to conclusions based on the
evidence and proceedings. If a judge comes to view a litigant as
dishonorable based on the adjudication itself, this is normally deemed to
be merely the product of judging. The Judicial Code is aimed primarily
at extrajudicial bias and avoiding adjudication by judges who appeared
to lack impartiality prior to participating in the case.143 Consequently,
Justice Benjamin’s invocation of Judge Sirica crusading for justice so
that the Watergate matter would not be swept under the rug by its
perpetrators, however heroic the image, is an inapt picture of the
disqualification situation presented in Caperton v. Massey.
After the West Virginia Supreme Court’s initial 2007 decision
vacating the judgment against Massey on the technical grounds of res
judicata and forum selection clause enforcement, another round of
disqualifications and motions resulted in a vacation of the opinion and
scheduled rehearing of the case. The Caperton parties again sought
Justice Benjamin’s disqualification in January 2008. Their motions
reiterated the earlier grounds and also noted that Justice Maynard, who
had socialized extensively with Blankenship—most notoriously in
Monte Carlo and was embarrassingly photographed while doing so—
voluntarily recused himself, strongly suggesting that another reasonable
person—a justice friendly with Blankenship who had voted for Massey
in the 2007 decision—had been forced to acknowledge that close ties to
the CEO of Massey raised reasonable questions regarding impartiality.144

which defendants were drawn “king of concealment and disinformation”); Reserve
Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 185–86 (8th Cir. 1976) (removing trial judge from
case because his dislike for defendant appeared to have transformed him from jurist to
advocate for plaintiffs). The Reserve Mining Co. court observed:
The record demonstrates overt acts by the district judge reflecting great
bias . . . and substantial disregard for the mandate of this court.
. . . [T]he record reveals more than a trial judge merely acting in accord with
his prior judgment.
Judge Lord seems to have shed the robe of the judge and to have assumed
the mantle of the advocate. The court thus becomes lawyer, witness and judge
in the same proceeding, and abandons the greatest virtue of a fair and conscientious
judge—impartiality.
Id.
143. See FLAMM, supra note 8, §§ 4.1–.7.
144. See 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 433a–39a (reproducing January 17,
2008 Motion of Harman Development Corporation, Harman Mining Corporation,
and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. for Disqualification of Justice Maynard and Renewal of
Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin).
To be fair to Justice Maynard, his recreational outings with Blankenship may not be
the attempts to “bribe” a justice with a vacation, as implicitly suggested by his critics.
Maynard and Blankenship have apparently been friends since childhood. See John O’Brien,
Supreme Court Says It Can’t Investigate Maynard-Blankenship Friendship, W. VA.
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In addition, the second attempt to disqualify Justice Benjamin built on
his denial of the prior motion, noting that in his earlier memorandum
denying recusal, Justice Benjamin stated that he had seen no evidence to
establish his bias, prejudice, or inability to be impartial:
[T]his is simply not the test against which Harman’s Motion should have been
decided. Rather, the test is whether a reasonable and objective person knowing
all the facts would harbor doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality. Indeed,
Justice Benjamin conceded as much when he committed shortly after his
election to considering recusal in cases involving Mr. Blankenship and Massey.
Justice Benjamin should also disclose the nature of this relationship with Mr.
Blankenship, including private meetings, dinners, etc.145

Counsel for the Caperton parties correctly read Justice Benjamin’s
April 2006 memorandum as invoking the language of objectivity and
appearance but in actuality required that he step aside only if it were
proven to his satisfaction that he could not be fair in a case involving
Blankenship. To be sure, Caperton counsel had an incentive to read the
first Benjamin memo in this manner for purposes of continuing their
challenge, but it appears no other reading is possible. Justice Benjamin,
despite having six months to think about the issue, used the wrong legal
test and decided the issue incorrectly. Now, more than two years after
the original motion for disqualification and more than three years after
the matter was raised during the election campaign, he was presented
with an opportunity for redemption—an opportunity he squandered.
On January 18, 2008, in another memorandum to the clerk of court,
Justice Benjamin again curtly denied to disqualify, essentially reiterating
the flawed approach of his April 2006 memorandum.146 He further

REC., Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.wvrecord.com/news/208928-supreme-court-says-it-cantinvestigate-maynard-blankenship-friendship (“They have been friends since their childhoods
in Mingo County . . . .”). However, Justice Maynard has stated that the now infamous
Monte Carlo vacation pictures resulted from the mere coincidence of the two men’s
separately deciding to take vacations on the Riviera at the same time. “[T]he two claim
the [Monaco] meeting was purely coincidental.” Id. Anyone willing to believe in this
sort of coincidence probably also has purchased the Brooklyn Bridge several times over.
But notwithstanding Justice Maynard’s credibility problems, he at least had the good
sense to step aside from Caperton v. Massey when these matters came to light. And, of
course, even without any vacations, a judge may be required to recuse if a key interested
party is a close friend.
145. 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 438a.
146. See 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 442a–43a (reproducing Memorandum
from Brent D. Benjamin, Chief Justice, W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals, to Rory L.
Perry, II, Clerk, W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals (Jan. 17, 2008) (regarding January
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criticized the movants for failing to introduce new information and
making the motion “after the undersigned filed his concurring opinion to
that majority opinion.”147 This is a judicial cheap shot. Justice Benjamin
was of course quite aware of the facts as the case unfolded. He knew
that questions had been raised about his ties to Blankenship even before
his election and that the movants had requested his disqualification at the
outset of the case. He also knew that the court’s decision to rehear the
matter and reconsider its 2007 decision on the merits had created an
opportunity for all parties to raise various issues. For example, the
Massey defendants successfully sought the recusal of Justice Starcher,
17, 2008 Motion of Disqualification of Justice Brent D. Benjamin filed by Appellees
Harman Development Corporation)). The memo explained:
A review of the instant motion reveals the motion to essentially be identical to
an earlier motion filed by movants in which I issued a memorandum on April
7, 2006 denying the prior motion, finding:
“[L]ittle if any [information in the motion] relates to this Justice and no
objective information is advanced to show that this Justice has a bias for
or against the litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters which
comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and
impartial in his consideration of matters related to this case.”
Id. (quoting Memorandum from Brent D. Benjamin, Chief Justice, W. Va. Supreme
Court of Appeals, to Rory L. Perry, II, Clerk, W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals (Apr. 7,
2006), reprinted in 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 125, at 336a).
This passage was bad enough when first issued and gets no better on a second reading.
In addition, it shows that Justice Benjamin appears to misunderstand the concept of
objective evidence. He incorrectly claims that none had been mustered in support of his
recusal. But all of the recusal motions are chock-full of objective evidence that cannot
reasonably be questioned: that Blankenship supported Benjamin’s candidacy with $3
million; that Blankenship is the CEO of Massey; that Massey had a case before the
Supreme Court in which it hoped Justice Benjamin would provide a supporting vote to
relieve it of a multimillion dollar judgment; that 100 news accounts noted the
Blankenship-Benjamin relationship; and that Justice Benjamin’s ability to be impartial in
Blankenship matters has been reasonably questioned by many. All of these are objectively,
undeniably true facts, whether Justice Benjamin likes it or not. He may be unpersuaded
by these facts, as well as burdening the facts with a greater task—proving his bias—than
is actually assigned by the law—raising reasonable question as to his impartiality. But
this does not change the reality that all of these facts are objective and unquestionable.
Although this is perhaps a relatively small point in the list of errors made by Justice
Benjamin, it clearly calls into question his ability to perform legal analysis. Second-year
law students are normally adept at correctly distinguishing the objective from
the subjective. At least in the April 2006 and January 2008 memoranda, in which his
own conduct was subject to scrutiny, Justice Benjamin botched this basic legal distinction.
147. In his memoranda, Justice Benjamin had an annoying tendency to refer to
himself in the royal third person (“this Justice” and “the undersigned”). 2 Joint Appendix,
supra note 99, at 443a (January 18, 2008 memorandum). Although pomposity is not an
impeachable offence, the tone of the memoranda is consistent with the mindset of a
judge on a pedestal, resistant to criticism and viewing oneself with a bit of a deified
attitude. His writing would have been improved by some straight talk about “I” or “me”
as well as a bit more consciousness that jurists are human beings and possess no special
quality that exempts them from basic psychology applicable to all humans.
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who had voted for Caperton in the 2007 decision. Against this backdrop, it
is simply absurd for Justice Benjamin to criticize the movants for making a
recusal motion when they did. It reflects unfairness and hostility toward the
movants and is dramatically inconsistent with judicial impartiality.
Continuing in the cheap shot mode, Justice Benjamin’s January 2008
memorandum also states that the “motion contains no specific legal
precedent for the position advanced by movants.”148 The motions
seeking his recusal had cited both U.S. Supreme Court and West
Virginia Supreme Court case law regarding the applicable standard for
disqualification. If Justice Benjamin intended to say that there were no
prior cases cited involving election support recusal, this may have been a
fair statement but is something of a red herring. Courts regularly make
legal determinations in the absence of precedent “on all fours” with an
instant matter by applying the clear principles of precedent to the facts at
hand. The movants had supplied such precedent that could have easily
and correctly been applied to determine that recusal was required due to
$3 million in campaign support just as it would be required if a judge’s
spouse held $3 million in litigant stock.
After this initial defensive salvo, the January 2008 memorandum more
seriously addresses the question of whether reasonable observers would
question his impartiality, noting that the state’s Department of Environmental
Protection decided not to seek his recusal in a Massey pollution case.149
Despite this generally helpful turn,150 Justice Benjamin refuses to
acknowledge that so much monetary aid from an interested person might
148. Id.
149. Id. at 443a–44a.
150. But not an entirely helpful turn. A state agency’s decision that grounds for
recusal did not exist in a regulatory matter involving Massey may be a fact to consider
regarding the reasonable perception of outside observers, but it is hardly a conclusive
fact. But Justice Benjamin treats this data point, drawn not from any formal legal papers
but from a newspaper account, as conclusive on the issue. See id. (citing Ken Ward Jr.,
Recusal Unnecessary, DEP Says, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 2005, at 1C).
Logically, Justice Benjamin should have surveyed legal and public sentiment on the
issue rather than clinging to one particularly favorable news account. His error was
compounded because during the course of the recusal proceedings, he repeatedly treated
unfavorable news accounts of public concern over his impartiality as irrelevant. What’s
sauce for the proverbial goose should be sauce for the metaphorical gander. If one news
account and one opinion of this sort are relevant, than all are relevant. And in this case,
the vast bulk of reporting suggests that most lawyers and laypersons would have reasonable
question as to Justice Benjamin’s impartiality. See 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 125, at
331a (reproducing Caperton motion to disqualify, which referred to approximately 100
media accounts raising matter of Benjamin’s impartiality).
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cause concern to a reasonable observer. Then, retreating from the actual
facts surrounding the motion, he attempts to argue that recusal under
these circumstances would be both antidemocratic and permit too much
strategic behavior by litigants:
[T]he need for a proper factual basis to support a motion for disqualification is
necessary to ensure that popularly-elected judges are not subject to mediadriven attacks from which they cannot defend themselves, from campaigns to
generate a veto power over judges by the creation and maintenance of public
controversy in media outlets, and from attempts to engage in “judge-shopping”
—a practice universally condemned. . . .
. . . To interpret the term “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” in such a
subjective and partisan manner as the movants seem to suggest, particularly
after this Justice voted in the Majority against their legal positions in this case,
would create a system where there would be almost no limit to recusal motions
and popularly-elected courts of this State would be open to “judge-shopping”
under the guise of litigation strategy.151

Now, that’s chutzpah! A justice whose election is the product of very
expensive judge shopping—in the form of Blankenship’s efforts to place
on the court a justice less likely to support a business tort plaintiff’s
large judgment against a campaign supporter—accuses his critics of
judge shopping. A justice who obtained his position due to mediadriven attacks on his opponent—regarded as misleading by many
observers152—attempts to paint himself as the victim, falsely claiming
that he cannot defend himself—in the body of his second memorandum
defending himself. He also exaggerates by claiming that recusal based
on campaign spending will create a veto over certain judges’ participation,
overlooking the fact that no one forced Blankenship to spend $3 million
or prevented candidate Benjamin from repudiating Blankenship’s smear
campaign against Justice McGraw.
Whether acting as a public-spirited citizen or a cunningly astute
businessperson, Blankenship is the one who created the instant problem,
and Justice Benjamin is at least guilty of allowing the situation to go
unchecked, allowing it to escalate to the point that it raised questions
about his ability to be impartial regarding Blankenship. Nothing
prevented Justice Benjamin from making a public repudiation of the
advertisements accusing Justice McGraw of pandering to pedophiles.
Nothing prevented Justice Benjamin from disavowing the And For The
Sake Of The Kids attacks on his opponent and asking voters to do the

151. 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 444a–45a (January 18, 2008
memorandum).
152. See supra Part II.B (describing hard-fought, arguably nasty and deceptive 2004
election won by Benjamin).
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same. Instead, Justice Benjamin ran a campaign that made substantial
use of the smear tactics, including Justice Benjamin’s own invocation of
the Tony Arbaugh pedophile/predator-set-free case against Justice
McGraw.153
In addition, Justice Benjamin is again taking a very cheap shot at the
movants by accusing them of belatedly seeking his disqualification due
to his rulings on the merits when in fact the movants had wanted him off
the case from the beginning. He attempts to turn a motion based on
extrajudicial factors—his ties to Blankenship—into one based on
judicially acquired factors, a tactic he amplifies by again misusing
Watergate’s United States v. Halderman precedent.154
Under these circumstances, Justice Benjamin is a bit like the child
who murders his parents and then asks for mercy due to his status as an
orphan. On the whole, his January 2008 memorandum is perhaps worse
than its predecessor April 2006 memorandum. Both reflect a jurist who
either grossly misunderstands the law or is willfully distorting it and
who either negligently or intentionally is making an erroneous decision
on the motion. Both memoranda also reflect a judge who has become
overly emotional and defensive about the challenge to his continued
participation. Both reflect a judge unnecessarily distorting the actions
and positions of the movants and grasping for a purported higher
principle—democracy, stability of the bench—that will excuse his very
low conduct in remaining on the case.155

153. See Timothy C. Bailey, Editorial, Supreme Court Race Ad Misrepresents
Decision, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 3, 2004, at 5A (chastising Benjamin for using
Arbaugh case in ads and misrepresenting facts).
154. See 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 445a (January 18, 2008 memorandum)
(citing United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 140 n.360 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); supra text
accompanying notes 139–44 (regarding inapplicability of Haldeman precedent).
155. In the context of academia, it has been observed that the lower the behavior at
issue, the higher the values that will be invoked to justify the conduct. Having attended a
few fractious faculty meetings during the past twenty-three years, I am inclined to agree.
Although it is on one level refreshing to see judges behaving no better than professors
(on their worst days), it is at a more basic level highly dispiriting to see a judge who
many would view as beholden to a predatory fat cat to be defending his actions by
reference to lofting concepts such as democracy and courageous events such as the system’s
ability to curb a law-breaking President in Watergate. Law is about making distinctions.
To paraphrase Senator Lloyd Bentsen’s famous comment during his 1988 vice presidential
debate with Senator Dan Quayle, Justice Benjamin is no Judge Sirica. Nor did the nation’s
founders seek to establish a democratic republic so that Justice Benjamin could decide
cases involving his $3 million campaign benefactor.
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Undaunted by a second rejection of their disqualification motion, in
March 2008, the Caperton parties filed another recusal motion,156 which,
in addition to renewing its prior arguments and continuing to urge
application of the correct legal standard, mustered new evidence and
argument based on survey research conducted for the case. To be sure,
the survey research sprung from advocacy in an adversary system, but
the material nonetheless on the whole added to the overwhelming case
for recusal.
The Caperton parties retained Talmey-Drake Research & Strategy,
Inc., a Colorado-based market research firm, to conduct random telephone
interviews with West Virginia residents.157 The 753 interviews took place
in late March 2008.158 Respondents were asked their opinion regarding
various persons and entities, including Massey Coal (on which the group
held slightly positive views) and Don Blankenship (on which the group
held slightly negative views, although nearly 40% were unaware of him,
suggesting that open insertion into the political process does not make
one a household word).159
Respondents were then asked about the Caperton v. Massey litigation,
of which roughly one-third of the group was aware.160 Respondents
were then told that Justice Spike Maynard had been photographed
vacationing with Blankenship in Monaco and had recused himself from
the case.161 Asked whether Justice Maynard’s decision was correct, 79%
agreed.162 Respondents were then asked of their awareness of Blankenship’s
support for Benjamin—one-third was aware163—and then asked:

156. 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 463a (reproducing March 28, 2008 Second
Renewed Joint Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin by Hugh Caperton et
al.).
157. Id. at 469a (reproducing Affidavit of Robert Drake, attached to Second Renewed
Joint Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin by Hugh Caperton et al.). Drake
was at the time Senior Vice President of Talmey-Drake.
158. Id. at 470a.
159. As a benchmark of sorts, the respondents were asked about longtime
Democratic U.S. Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W. Va.), the grandson of Standard Oil
founder John D. Rockefeller and a member of one of America’s richest, most famous
families, with more than 60% of the group expressing positive views of the Senator and
only 2% unaware of him. Id. at 474a (reproducing Appendix to Affidavit, which reproduced
the survey instrument).
160. Id. at 475a.
161. Id. at 475a–76a.
162. Id. at 476a.
163. Id.
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Thinking first about the $75 million dollar judgment against Massey Coal
Company, does the three and a half million dollars the head of Massey Energy
spent to help elect Justice Benjamin to the court create doubt in your mind that
Justice Benjamin will be fair and impartial, or do you feel he can be fair and
impartial?164

Of the respondents polled, 66% said they had doubts while only 15%
thought Justice Benjamin could be impartial under these circumstances.165
Based on these results, the Caperton parties now argued that they had
powerful additional proof that the mythical reasonable observer, as
reflected in the survey, would have doubts about Justice Benjamin’s
impartiality.166
Justice Benjamin responded within days, denying the renewed motion
in a third memorandum, dated April 3, 2008, that both reiterated his
earlier rationale for denial and attacked the Talmey-Drake survey.167 He
again criticized the movants for making the motion late, this time
perhaps having a point. Although he ignored that the movants had been
seeking his disqualification since the inception of the matter on the
court’s docket, this last motion came only days before the court issued
its second decision on the merits of the case on April 3, 2008.168 The
understandably annoyed justice was rushing to deny the recusal in time
for the court’s issuance of its second opinion on the merits in a judicial
version of beat the clock.
In the greater context of the case, however, Justice Benjamin’s
treatment of the timeliness issue remains unfair to the movants. He
contended:
The said motion relies on arguments which relate to the 2004 campaign and
which could have been advanced in a timely manner, but have instead been
raised now, nearly four years after the 2004 race, during the pendency of a new

164. Id.
165. Id. at 477a.
166. Id. at 467a (reproducing Second Renewed Joint Motion for Disqualification of
Justice Benjamin by Hugh Caperton).
167. Id. at 483a (reproducing Memorandum from Brent D. Benjamin, Chief Justice,
W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals, to Rory L. Perry, II, Clerk, W. Va. Supreme Court of
Appeals (Apr. 3, 2008) (regarding Caperton v. Massey Second Renewed Joint Motion for
Disqualification of Justice Benjamin)).
168. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008),
vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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2008 political race. Citing no good cause for the delay in raising issues which
could have been earlier raised, the said motion is untimely.169

Justice Benjamin is, of course, incorrect to accuse the movants of
failing to raise issues that could have been raised earlier. From October
2005 forward, the movants had raised the issue of his impartiality.
Having been repeatedly denied relief despite a compelling case, the
Caperton parties did what any litigant with deep enough pockets and
high enough stakes would do. They made one last attempt to meet the
judge’s objections to recusal with more persuasive evidence and
argument by obtaining additional data about what reasonable persons
might think about Justice Benjamin’s ability to be impartial. By this
point, they of course knew it was a long shot with Justice Benjamin. But
in an adversary system, a fair observer can hardly fault Caperton counsel
for trying to change the judicial mind through the introduction of new
empirical evidence intended to overcome Justice Benjamin’s contention
that prior motions had been based only on conjecture. Seen in context, it
is simply incorrect and unfair to label this an unjustified and belated
motion. Rather, it is a motion born of frustration due to the justice’s
continued refusal to acknowledge basic reality about the appearances
created by his links to Blankenship.
This aspect of the April 2008 memorandum may seem minor but it
shines a bright light on very dark behavior by Justice Benjamin. Instead
of giving the disqualification motions a fair hearing, which he should
have done in late 2005, he resorts to a rhetorical trick. By erroneously
denying the first motion, he attempts to argue that each subsequent
motion is untimely or strategic—a mere rehashing of an issue on which
the movant has already lost. In truth, the subsequent motions were made
necessary only because of Justice Benjamin’s initial egregious error.
For counsel to attempt to persuade the court to reverse earlier error is
never improper and does not become untimely until deadlines have
passed and a matter has become final. As of March 2008, decision on
the merits remained pending—although just barely. Rather than harping
at the red herring of purported delay, Justice Benjamin should have
devoted more attention to the merits of the motion.
In the main, however, Justice Benjamin’s April 2008 memorandum
criticized the methodology of the survey:

169. 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 483a (reproducing Memorandum from
Brent D. Benjamin, Chief Justice, W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals, to Rory L. Perry, II,
Clerk, W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals (Apr. 3, 2008) (regarding Caperton v. Massey
Second Renewed Joint Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin)).
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It is further observed that this joint motion has been filed during the pendency
of a 2008 political race in which two seats on the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals are to be elected; that the said survey specifically references one
candidate [Justice Maynard] in the said race who is a member of this Court and
who has recused himself in this case; and that the said survey does not reference
another member of this Court [Justice Starcher] who also has recused himself in
this case, but who is not a candidate in the said race.170

Justice Benjamin appears to be invoking a non sequitur by suggesting
that the survey is defective because it addresses only recusal questions
concerning Blankenship-related justices. A more persuasive argument is
that because of the disclosure that Justice Maynard had recused,
respondents may have been unduly influenced to conclude that Justice
Benjamin should also have recused, even though Maynard undoubtedly
had more fun in Monaco than did Benjamin on the campaign trail.
Despite Benjamin’s misdirected criticism, he is onto something. Once
respondents see Justice Maynard stepping aside due to Blankenship ties,
it looks bad when Justice Benjamin failed to do so. In addition, even a
luxury vacation in Monaco costs a lot less than the $3 million Blankenship
spent electing Justice Benjamin, a factor tending to make Justice Benjamin
look bad in comparison to Justice Maynard.171
Justice Benjamin both hits on a more debatable point and displays a
certain self-centered judicial arrogance when he observes that the
“survey” which appears to be a “push poll” specifically designed with limited
information for the purpose of supporting the instant joint motion, is, as a matter
of law, neither credible nor sufficiently reliable to serve as a basis for an elected
judge’s disqualification.172

Without benefit of citation to precedent, he broadly announces that
surveys of the type in question are incredible “as a matter of law” and

170. Id.
171. In addition, as previously noted, Justice Maynard contends, however unpersuasively,
that he was vacationing on his own in Monaco and just happened to run into his old
friend Blankenship, which resulted in the pictures of them on the Riviera. If this
contention were correct, this would be another reason for viewing Maynard’s situation as
less troubling than Benjamin’s. In any event, notwithstanding his recusal, Justice Maynard
was unseated in the ensuing fall 2008 election by challengers Menis Ketchum and Margaret
Workman. See Lawrence Messina, New Justices Likely To Keep State’s High Court Calm,
Moderate in 2009, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 12, 2009, at 10A; Lawrence Messina,
West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Takes Oath; Workman Returns to Bench, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Dec. 30, 2008, at 1C. Cynics among us might wonder whether Justice Maynard
would have stepped aside had he not been facing reelection.
172. 2 Joint Appendix, supra note 99, at 483a (April 3, 2008 memorandum).
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have no evidentiary value for a recusal motion. One wonders on what
authority—other than personal preference and self-interest—he based
this assessment. Although push polls, discussed more below, must be
viewed with care and are often—perhaps even usually—too misleading
to be of any evidentiary value, the survey nonetheless provides
additional data that are quite consistent with other information about
public concern over Benjamin participation in Blankenship cases.
Besides, the movants were not attempting to obtain recusal solely on the
basis of the survey. Rather, they were arguing that the survey provided
additional support for their already meritorious arguments and were
seeking to force an epiphany from Justice Benjamin.
His concern over survey methodology does, however, raise serious
questions about the persuasiveness of the survey. As noted above, the
survey sets the table for an opinion adverse to Justice Benjamin by
relating the story of Justice Maynard’s recusal. In doing so, the survey
also gives respondents the mental image of Blankenship’s wining and
dining a justice on the Riviera as well as giving survey respondents antiBenjamin facts such as the large amount of the Blankenship campaign
support, arguably misstating it as $3.5 million rather than $3 million.173
In addition, the survey question pumps up the amount of the Caperton v.
Massey judgment as much as possible, calling it $75 million—because
of accrued interest—rather than simply using the jury verdict of “only”
roughly $50 million.174 Further, a much larger—$240 million—judgment
against Massey Energy is invoked although this is arguably outside the
scope of the precise case pending before the court.175
Although Justice Benjamin, perhaps in a hurry and too annoyed to
spend more time on his memorandum, does not fully explore these
issues, one can argue that the survey is indeed flawed and needs to be
taken with the proverbial grain (or shaker) of salt. But even if
compromised, the survey has some evidentiary value unless it can be
characterized as completely misleading. Notwithstanding whatever
imperfections surround the presentation of the situation to the
respondents, the fact remains that by a 4:1 ratio, they questioned Justice
Benjamin’s impartiality.176 Although the reasonable person standard is
not an invitation for a plebiscite, these are awfully strong numbers.
Combined with other factors of public record, the case for disqualification
appears, on the whole, strengthened by the survey results.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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See id.
See id. at 477a.
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Was the survey a “push poll”? A push poll is generally viewed as a
poll in which the respondent is not asked for opinion in a vacuum or in a
sufficiently neutral setting but instead is first given information that is
clearly designed to bias the respondent toward a particular answer.177
For example, a Democratic pollster currently operating in Nevada might
ask, “Are you aware that Senator John Ensign (R-Nev.) recently
admitted to having an affair with an office staff worker who was one of
his wife’s best friends and that after his mistress stopped working for the
Senator, his parents paid her nearly $100,000?”178 Although these facts
are all in the public domain and appear—according to consistent media
reports undenied by the Senator—unquestionably true, most everyone
would view this type of approach as a push poll. It provides the respondent
with highly inflammatory information about this politician without
providing any airing of his side of the story.179 Consequently, one would
reasonably expect that when the respondent is then immediately asked
for an opinion about the politician, it will be considerably more negative
than if the initial question had never been asked.
The survey done by the Caperton parties of course has some elements
of a push poll in that it provides information, some of it quite negative,
prior to asking the respondent’s opinion. But telling the respondents
about relatively noninflammatory, unquestioned facts, such as the
Maynard vacation and the Benjamin campaign support, is a far cry from
the type of nasty push polls seen during the height of campaign season.
While Justice Benjamin is correct in pointing out problems with the
survey, he appears incorrect in completely discounting it.

177. See generally RUSS A. DEWEY, Push Polls, in PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION
(2007), http://www.psywww.com/intropsych/ch01_psychology_and_science/push_polls.html
(explaining push polls as “thinly disguised attempts to sway the opinion of the people
who are being questioned”).
178. I am not making this up. Molly Ball, Extramarital Affair: Ensign Explains His
Silence: Potential Inquiries Prevent Response, LAS VEGAS REV. J., July 25, 2009,
http://www.lvrj.com/news/51692247.html (discussing nine-month affair and other details
surrounding scandal); Molly Ball, Senator’s Affair: Ensign Wounds Keep Festering:
News that Parents Paid Hamptons $96,000 Adds to Questions, LAS VEGAS REV. J., July
12, 2009, http://www.lvrj.com/news/50575447.html.
179. Although reporters following the Ensign matter have not been very impressed
with his side of the story, a survey respondent might be more favorably disposed to
Senator Ensign if they were aware that he has apologized, expressed regret, and
characterized the $96,000 in payments by his parents as a charitable gift rather than as
hush money, as might otherwise be inferred by the respondent. See sources cited supra
note 178.
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On the heels of this third denial of recusal, the West Virginia Supreme
Court issued its second opinion on the merits in Caperton v. Massey,
again by a 3–2 margin holding that reversed Caperton’s victory, ruling
that the claim was barred by res judicata due to an earlier breach of
contract case in Virginia brought by a Caperton company against a
Massey company.180 The majority also ruled that the controversy was
subject to a forum selection clause and thus never should have been
litigated in West Virginia at all.181 It was this decision from which
Caperton successfully sought certiorari review on the ground that his due
process rights were violated by Justice Benjamin’s participation in the
case.182
But Justice Benjamin, responding to the strong dissent in the case, was
not finished defending his decision not to recuse. In late July 2008,
while the machinery of U.S. Supreme Court review was getting
underway,183 Justice Benjamin, obviously hoping to stave off further
review, issued a lengthy written concurring opinion defending the
majority’s res judicata and forum selection rulings as well as reiterating
his view that his disqualification was not required.184
As previously discussed, Justice Benjamin’s three prior memoranda
regarding recusal were all deeply flawed in that they applied the
incorrect legal standard, reached highly questionable conclusions, made
illegitimate criticisms of the movants, and incorrectly confused
disqualification and the public’s rights regarding how judges are
elected.185 In Benjamin’s defense, one might minimize the badness of
these memoranda by pointing out that they were short and, in at least the
third case, created hurriedly to respond to a motion. By July 2008,
Justice Benjamin had had nearly four years to establish a coherent
framework for assessing his participation in Blankenship-related cases as
well as time to write at length. In addition, he likely was writing for the

180. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 256–64 (W. Va.
2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
181. See id. at 248–56.
182. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265–67.
183. Certiorari was granted in Caperton on July 2, 2008. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2008 WL 2676568. Petitioners’ brief
was filed in late 2008. See Brief for Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22),
2008 WL 5433361. Respondents’ brief was filed in January 28, 2009. See Brief for
Respondents, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22), 2009 WL 216165. Petitioners responded
one month later. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22),
2009 WL 476570. Some seventeen amicus briefs were also submitted in January 2009.
See supra notes 55–56.
184. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 285–309 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring).
185. See supra Part II.C.
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Supreme Court, hoping that the petition filed three weeks earlier would
be denied. One might have expected a better defense of his
nondisqualification.
Instead, the July 2008 concurrence raises even more questions about
Justice Benjamin’s legal ability, emotional stability, and even his candor
and motives. Notwithstanding some significant time for cooling off, the
July 2008 concurrence continues in highly defensive mode as Justice
Benjamin continues to “protest too much” about the challenge to his
participation.186 Perhaps more importantly, he continues to use the
wrong legal standard despite having repeatedly had the opportunity to
realize that he initially was asking the wrong question—whether he
subjectively felt biased or prejudiced.187 He blithely concludes because
186. Justice Benjamin criticized the Caperton parties for their use of the TalmeyDrake survey and again labeled it a “push-poll”:
Proper legal decisions should never be mere rationalizations fronting for
political correctness. Nor should actual justice be fettered by the political expediencies
of the day. Partisan rhetoric and resorts to emotion-laden rants betray a contempt
for the judiciary’s role in a constitutional government. Sadly, such political
considerations have, it seems from recent behaviors, institutionalized and entrenched
themselves in our Court.
Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 294 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring). The opinion continued:
“The very notion of appearance-driven disqualifying conflicts, with shifting definitional
standards subject to the whims, caprices, and manipulations of those more interested in
outcomes than in the application of law, is antithetical to due process.” Id. at 292–93
n.11. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text.
187. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 292 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring) (“Nor
does the Dissenting opinion, or the Appellees herein, claim any actual bias or prejudice
on my part in this case.”). Benjamin incorrectly accuses the dissenting justices of
advancing a subjective test for judicial disqualification. Id. at 293 n.12. He also
addresses due process recusal, even though all efforts to disqualify him in the case were
based on the Code of Judicial Conduct’s “reasonable question as to impartiality standard.” Id.
at 294–95. Finally, Benjamin determines that the focus in judicial disqualification “is on
what actually affects a judge’s decision-making” rather than appearances or questions as
to impartiality. Id. at 295.
In addition, Justice Benjamin pays homage to the notion of a “duty to sit,” a doctrine
abolished by the ABA Model Code in 1972 and federal recusal law in 1974. Id. at 294–
95. See generally Stempel, supra note 72 (tracing history and status of “duty to sit,” and
criticizing concept for creating presumption of deciding close cases against recusal when
public confidence in courts is better served when close cases are decided in favor of
recusal). The doctrine appears to remain good law in West Virginia although Justice
Benjamin seems to recognize its abolition at the federal level. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at
296 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring). Benjamin only concedes that the doctrine was
“arguably” abolished when it was in fact eradicated more than thirty years ago. Id.
There remains a judicial responsibility to hear and decide cases, currently codified in
Rule 2.7 of the 2007 ABA Model Code. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.7
(2007). But this principle yields to the recusal requirements of Rule 2.11 of the Code,
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the mere presence of some campaign contributions is “an insufficient
basis, alone, to require disqualification” that it automatically follows that
“contributions by a third-person to a completely independent campaign—
with no ties to the judicial candidate—do not rise to a due process
requirement of disqualification.”188 Ignored in this “analysis,” of course,
is the practical impact of these so-called independent expenditures and
the magnitude of those made by Blankenship in the 2004 West Virginia
Supreme Court race.
In addition, Justice Benjamin persists in addressing an issue—recusal
standards under the Due Process Clause—that was not germane to the
Caperton motions, which were based on the recusal under the Judicial
Code rather than due process.189 Because Justice Benjamin erroneously
refused to recuse pursuant to the Judicial Code, the Caperton parties
were forced to seek U.S. Supreme Court review and make the ultimately
successful argument that his participation in the case not only violated
the Judicial Code—old Canon 3(E)(1) and new Rule 2.11—but also
deprived them of due process of law.190
Justice Benjamin’s tardy tagalong attempt to lobby the Supreme Court
is a problematic exercise of judicial power191 but not any better
exploration of the basic recusal issues he had faced—and mangled—in
his three prior memoranda denying recusal. Nonetheless, his continued
insistence on talking about almost everything but the correct legal
standard for recusal seems odd. Because so much other information

and there no longer is any presumption against disqualification in close cases. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11; see Stempel, supra note 72, at 827–29.
188. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 306 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring).
189. See id.
190. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). Because the
greater includes the lesser, the U.S. Supreme Court’s finding of a due process violation
necessarily includes a finding that a reasonable person would have doubts about Justice
Benjamin’s impartiality. However close the U.S. Supreme Court vote in Caperton, there
is no question that Benjamin erred.
191. There is an apt time, place, and manner for all activities. If Justice Benjamin
wished to engage in a lengthy analysis of the recusal issues in the case, the time for that
was well before July 2008. Even with the rush of judicial business, it is more than
strange that he was expending judicial resources to concur nearly four months after the
decision on the merits and the dissents of Justices Albright and Cookman that appeared
to enrage him greatly. By this point, his focus should have been on achieving better
resolution of the cases still pending before the West Virginia Supreme Court. Using the
concurrence to lobby the U.S. Supreme Court seems a misuse of the judicial office—to
try for a sort of last word on due process recusal when that was not the issue properly
before him—as well as a waste of time given that the case was being extensively
lawyered by competent counsel. If anything, the July 2008 Benjamin concurrence may
have hurt Massey’s cause in that it was poorly executed as compared to Massey’s own
submissions and amicus briefs in support of Massey.
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suggests that Justice Benjamin is not dumb, his continued adherence to
the obviously wrong legal standard could suggest to a reasonable
observer that he was intentionally misstating the law in order to avoid
missing a chance to assist Blankenship. Could it really be that after four
years he just did not “get it” regarding the correct approach to judicial
disqualification under the Code?
The concurrence is lengthy and filled with citations but fails to
properly address the relevant legal questions. For example, on the
merits, Justice Benjamin defends the court majority’s views on res
judicata and enforcement of forum selection clauses.192 But his defense
is largely based on simply citing cases expressing broad principles of
these areas of law.193 Nowhere in the twenty-seven-page concurrence
does he explain why he thinks the Virginia breach of contract action
sufficiently involves the same claim so as to preclude the fraud and
tortious interference claims brought by Caperton in West Virginia.194
Similarly, nowhere in the concurrence is there any discussion of why he
is so sure that the forum selection clause, which requires that “[a]ll
actions brought in connection with [the 1997 contract between
Sovereign Coal, Wellmore Coal, and Harman Mining] shall be filed in
and decided by the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Virginia,”195 is
sufficiently broad to encompass the West Virginia litigation, which in
essence contended—successfully before a jury of apparently reasonable
people—that Blankenship and Massey schemed to destroy Caperton and
his companies.196
Regarding the issue of disqualification, the July 2008 concurrence
exhibits the same pattern of continually making pronouncements that are
irrelevant to the actual legal question at issue.197 More than even in his
three prior memoranda, Justice Benjamin in his concurrence continues to
assert that he is not biased in favor of Blankenship or prejudiced against
192. See Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 287 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring).
193. Id. at 290 (extensively citing cases on general propositions of preclusion law,
in particular judicial support for the transactional approach to res judicata, but failing to
ever apply the elements of the transactional approach to Caperton v. Massey and attempt
to persuade the reader that the test had been satisfied). He also extensively cites cases
supporting de novo review of forum selection clauses but fails to explain why the forum
selection clause at issue in Caperton v. Massey applied to the dispute. Id. at 291–92.
194. Id. passim.
195. Id. at 234 (majority opinion).
196. Id. at 291–92 (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 187–88.
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his opponents. As noted repeatedly above, this is not the correct legal
standard. The correct question is not whether he is biased or prejudiced
or thinks he has bias or prejudice. The correct question is whether a
reasonable observer might have doubts about his impartiality. In
twenty-seven pages, this question is never addressed. After four years of
hard-fought campaigning and litigation, Justice Benjamin continued to
articulate the wrong legal standard.
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, even a dog distinguishes
between being stepped on and being kicked.198 At some juncture,
litigants, lawyers, and the public have a right to ask whether a judge’s
continued gross error in legal analysis is merely the product of limited
intellectual capacity or is instead an intentional effort to avoid a result
the judge dislikes. As noted above, Justice Benjamin successfully
practiced law for more than twenty years, having graduated from a
respected law school, Ohio State. Is he really so dense that after years of
opportunity and prompting, he remains unable to apply the correct legal
standard, however badly? Or is it fair for observers to conclude that he
is intentionally distorting the analysis to avoid recusal?
The apt test for recusal under the Judicial Code—as distinguished
from the more difficult test for recusal under the Due Process Clause—is
straightforward. In the nearly fifteen years that I have tested students on
the concept as part of a professional responsibility course that includes
judicial ethics in the syllabus, nearly all students appreciate the
distinction between the reasonable-doubt-about-impartiality test and an
actual bias or prejudice test—and related inquires such as whether there
is an “undue risk” or “probability” of bias, the standard adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court for recusal governed by the Due Process Clause.199
Some student exam writers err, to be sure. But these students are working
under intense time pressure in closed-book exams. Mistakes are
inevitable, even for good students.
By contrast, Justice Benjamin was engaged in what might be
described as a thirty-three-month (more if one goes back to the 2004
election), take-home, open-book exam in which he was aided by the
parties briefing the issue, who were represented by some of the best
attorneys in the nation, and a law clerk, who was a founding partner in a

198. See Sévane Garibian, Taking Denial Seriously: Genocide Denial and Freedom
of Speech in French Law, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 485 n.27 (2008); sources
cited supra note 18.
199. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
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successful firm.200 How could Justice Benjamin have erred so badly under
these circumstances? Three explanations seem possible: (1) despite his
success, he is not particularly bright or not a good legal analyst; (2) he
was so emotionally upset over the perceived attack on his integrity that
he was unable to think straight notwithstanding the passage of time and
the factors regularly informing him of the errors of his legal analysis; or
(3) he committed knowing legal error in order to attempt to justify
impermissible favoritism toward a campaign benefactor.
Obviously, the last explanation is the most damning, although none of
these possible reasons give one much confidence in Justice Benjamin’s
fitness for the bench. If Justice Benjamin were stupid, he almost
certainly would not be where he is today. His writing is eloquent, even
if it tends to mask large analytic errors. Similarly, if he were so thinskinned and emotionally damaged that it affected his thinking this
greatly, we probably would have discovered it before now—and it
would have impeded his considerable legal and political success.
Consequently and sadly, one can make a compelling case that Justice
Benjamin was corruptly misstating the law and misdirecting the legal
analysis to stay on the case to aid Blankenship, although this thesis is
undermined by his votes against Massey in other cases, a factor
discussed below.201
Perhaps Justice Benjamin’s integrity is above reproach. Perhaps he is
a skilled legal analyst who simply occasionally slips into an intellectual
trough from which he was unable to escape because of emotional
attitudes about the motion, its implied criticism of him, or his
relationship with Blankenship. But even if these explanations, rather
than corruption, explain his failure to recuse, he remains unexonerated.
Any of the three likely explanations for his failures in Caperton v.
Massey raise serious questions about the judge’s fitness for the bench.
Clearly, judges who do not understand the law are not good. Similarly,
thin-skinned, emotionally distracted judges are inconsistent with the
ideal of dispassionate judging based on substantive reason. And, of
course, judges with a hidden agenda of assisting a favored party should
not be holding judicial office. Regardless of which explanation accounts

200. See Paul J. Nyden, Starcher off Massey Case: Justice Suggests Colleague
Benjamin Do the Same, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 2008, at 4A (stating that Charles R.
McElwee, owner of a Charleston law firm, is Justice Benjamin’s senior law clerk).
201. See infra text accompanying notes 205–11.
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for Justice Benjamin’s atrocious conduct in Caperton v. Massey, there is
now serious question regarding his fitness for the bench. The state’s
judicial discipline commission or legislature should investigate the
matter and take apt action, a topic addressed in Part IV below.
But, as they say in the infomercials: “Wait—there’s more.” Not
content to let his July 2008 concurrence, filed months after the decision
on the merits, be his last word on the issue of disqualification, Justice
Benjamin used or perhaps abused his power as chief justice to enlist, at
least ostensibly, the entire West Virginia Supreme Court, or at least its
staff under his control, in a rearguard action attempting to support his
nonrecusal and to influence the outcome of Caperton v. Massey before
the U.S. Supreme Court.202 On March 2, 2009, while Caperton was
briefed and pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the West Virginia
Supreme Court issued a press release giving a “Summary of Chief
Justice Benjamin’s Dispositive Voting Record Regarding Massey
Energy Cases from 01/01/2005 to 12/31/2008.”203 State supreme courts
are generally not in the habit of attempting to defend the recusal
decisions of individual justices by issuing press releases designed to
influence pending review. At apt junctures, judges have ample ability to
issue detailed rulings on disqualification—as Justice Benjamin did with
his July 2008 concurrence. The individual, nonrecusing jurist hardly
needs a public relations campaign on his or her behalf.
The press release was obviously designed again to lobby the U.S.
Supreme Court and did so in a manner that limited the ability of the
Caperton parties to dispute the contents while providing the Massey
parties with additional ammunition in their fight to keep their slim
victory in the West Virginia Supreme Court. Justice Benjamin’s
behavior in this regard is ironic in light of his having previously
lambasted the Caperton parties for submitting survey research late in the
state court proceedings in a last ditch effort to obtain recusal.204

202. Press Release, Supreme Court of Appeals, State of W. Va., Summary of Chief
Justice Benjamin’s Dispositive Voting Record Regarding Massey Energy Cases from
01/01/2005 to 12/31/2008 (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/
press/march2_09.htm.
203. See id. The press release was issued on the letterhead of the Supreme Court of
Appeals, State of West Virginia, listing the court’s address and contact information,
informing readers that they may obtain more information from designated employees of
the court’s public information office. The release is labeled “News” in bold type significantly
larger than the other typefaces used in the release. Id.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 157–72 (discussing survey research employed
by Caperton parties in support of their third disqualification motion).
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The informational content in the news release is that overall Justice
Benjamin voted against Massey-related—Blankenship-related—entities
more than 80% of the time while on the court and that these Massey
losses involved millions of dollars in liability.205 Although this is
interesting and perhaps relevant at the margin, it hardly settles the
recusal issue. Because the correct inquiry regarding recusal is the
reasonable question as to impartiality standard and because recusal is to
be decided at the outset of a case, post hoc empirical data about a
judge’s actual votes are nearly or perhaps entirely irrelevant to the
inquiry.206
In other Massey cases, the issues may have been so clear-cut that even
a biased judge could not cast a vote for Massey. For example, in two of
the Massey cases cited in the press release, the vote was unanimous207

205. See Press Release, Supreme Court of Appeals, State of W. Va., supra note 202.
206. If there had been unwitting participation in a case that was later recognized
(for example, the judge’s brother owns a few shares of stock in a company), reasonable
people might conclude that it would be foolish to upset the result of a case when the
judge had voted against the company, particularly when the overall court vote was not
close or when the result was not considered particularly debatable. But this was not
Caperton, which involved nearly four years of active resistance to recuse by a judge
applying incorrect analysis and doing so in a highly combative manner. Finding out that
he voted against Massey in some other cases hardly washes out the stain.
207. See May v. Bd. of Review, 664 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 2008) (reversing denial of
unemployment benefits for Don Blankenship’s former personal maid, who alleged
constructive discharge due to mistreatment and changes in assignments); Davis v. Eagle
Coal & Dock Co., 640 S.E.2d 81 (W. Va. 2006) (answering certified question regarding
state court jurisdiction over silica dust claim with a 5–0 vote); see also Press Release,
Supreme Court of Appeals, State of W. Va., supra note 202. In May, Justice Maynard,
who had been photographed in Monaco with Blankenship, recused, as was the case in the
second Caperton decision on the merits, but Justice Benjamin nonetheless participated in
a manner consistent with his refusal to recuse in Caperton. See May, 664 S.E.2d at 719.
May also provides a fascinating view of the rarified pedestal upon which Blankenship
apparently lives his life. May, employed by Mate Creek Security, earned less than $9 an
hour working as a maid at a “three story home owned by Rawl Sales in Sprigg, West
Virginia” that was occupied by Blankenship. Id. at 716. The case was unclear as to
whether Blankenship paid rent or received the home as a business perk. Over a threeyear period, Blankenship steadily increased duties and demands for which May received
no additional compensation. Id. In addition, as the court majority noted with some restraint,
May “also submitted rather colorful evidence . . . of Mr. Blankenship’s strident behavior
which . . . added to the Appellant’s stress. For example . . . she was required to write to Mr.
Blankenship explaining why there was no ice cream in the freezer at one of the houses.”
Id. at 718–19.
Concurring, Justice Albright (who voted against Massey in Caperton) and Justice
Starcher (who recused from the second Caperton decision on the merits) were more
graphic, noting evidence from the record that Blankenship had “physically grabbed”
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while another was decided in a 4–1 vote and a fourth by a 3–1–1 vote.208
Caperton was the only reported decision for which Justice Benjamin
provided the swing vote.209 Consequently, one can easily use Justice
Benjamin’s own press release against him: when he provided the
decisive vote in a reported case, he supported Massey one hundred
percent of the time.
A similar but more mixed situation exists regarding consideration of
petitions involving Massey. Most were by lopsided votes. Justice
Benjamin provided a pivotal vote for Massey in only one of the eighteen
cases,210 but only two of these cases were cliffhangers—Justice Benjamin
May and began throwing a misplaced McDonald’s order at her in anger when the fast
food vendor had filled it incorrectly and reportedly told her “‘[a]ny time I want you to do
exactly what I tell you to do and nothing more and nothing less.’” Id. at 720 (Albright &
Starcher, JJ., concurring). When May forgot to “leave a coat hanger out” for
Blankenship to hang his coat, his “reaction was to tear the coat hanger and tie rack out of
the closet,” conduct the concurring justices found “shocking.” Id. Blankenship himself
was apparently stressed, writing May a note that he “had 3 dogs stolen in 9 days, mines
robbed, people complain incessantly, all of them want more money. None of them do
what their (sic) asked.” Id.
Alas, “uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND
PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act 3, sc. 1, l. 31. Most of us could, however,
probably endure these headaches in return for receiving the large compensation and other
benefits presumably flowing to the CEO of one of the nation’s largest coal companies.
In contrast, litigants asserting First Amendment rights are often less than exemplary
characters. See Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (reversing victory
for political activist, the late Reverend Jerry Falwell, against Hustler publisher Larry
Flynt). Regarding the victory, Flynt stated, “If the First Amendment will protect a scumbag
like me, then it will protect all of you. Because I’m the worst.” Frank Rich, Pornographer
Glorifies Constitution, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Oct. 15, 1996, at A5. Just the same, knowing a
little more about Blankenship’s apparent treatment of other human beings and how close
a man like that came to putting a hand-picked jurist on a reviewing court of last resort hardly
inspires great confidence in the American system. At least Flynt had some perspective
about himself.
208. See Helton v. Reed, 638 S.E.2d 160 (W. Va. 2006) (reversing decision below
in coal company’s favor regarding improperly filed petition for corporate tax refund and
answering certified question regarding state court jurisdiction, a 4–1 vote against Massey);
U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton, 631 S.E.2d 559, 577 (W. Va. 2005) (Benjamin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (involving coal company challenge to state
severance tax formula, reported as 3–1–1 vote in a press release because Justice
Benjamin had concurred in part and dissented in part). Justice Maynard, who ultimately
recused in Caperton because of his social connections to Blankenship, see supra note 10,
dissented and supported Massey, U.S. Steel Mining, 631 S.E.2d at 568 (Maynard, J.,
dissenting).
209. See Press Release, Supreme Court of Appeals, State of W. Va., supra note 202.
210. See id. (citing Marfork Coal Co. v. Dir., W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No.
051011 (W. Va. Nov. 3, 2005) (granting petition for review by 3–2 vote in favor of
Massey, with Justice Benjamin casting vote for Massey in case involving surface mining
permit and casting vote against Massey subsidiary), and Jackson v. Power Mountain
Coal Co., No. 072598, Civ. Action No. 05-C-10 (W. Va. Apr. 24, 2008) (refusing
petition for review by 3–2 vote in favor of Massey, with Justice Benjamin casting vote
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did oppose Massey on one matter in which it prevailed by a single vote;
opposition did not change the result.211 Preservation of confidence in the
judiciary requires that the public be confident that judges hearing cases
will be especially impartial about close or difficult cases, which are the
type of cases in which a judge’s unconscious lack of neutrality could
unfairly tip the scales. A closer look at the voting patterns of Justice
Benjamin in Massey-related cases is far less comforting than his
assertion that because he opposed Massey most of the time, he must be
unquestionably unbiased.
More to the point for this Article, the voting record news release and
its strategic deployment in an attempt to influence the U.S. Supreme
Court casts further doubt on Justice Benjamin’s judicial performance.
What could be initially analogized as a mistake made on the fly when
dealing with a busy docket—Justice Benjamin’s initial bad decision
refusing recusal—steadily begins to look more and more like intended
shirking of judicial responsibility in that he continues to enunciate a
legal standard that any reasonable jurist would now recognize as wrong
and relentlessly attempts to put a favorable public relations spin on his
nonrecusal. By March 2009, Justice Benjamin had become a veritable

against Massey)). The other cases involve petitions—three seeking interlocutory relief
through writs of probation. See id. (citing West Virginia ex rel. Cent. W. Va. Energy Co.
v. Wilson, No. 34403, Civ. Action No. 08-C-160 (W. Va. Oct. 23, 2008) (5–0 vote for
Massey); West Virginia ex rel. Independence Coal Co. v. Hoke, No. 071498, Civ. Action
Nos. 03-C-185, 03-C-201 & 05-C-165 (W. Va. June 6, 2007) (4–0 against Massey);
West Virginia ex rel. Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Gaughan, No. 052797, Civ. Action No.
05-C-85 (W. Va. Jan. 11, 2006) (5–0 vote against Massey)). In addition, there were
eight cases involving petitions for review in which Massey lost by two or more votes.
See id. (citing Burns v. Independence Coal Co., No 081402, Civ. Action No. 06-C-80
(W. Va. Nov. 12, 2008) (4–1 against Massey); Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Cent.
W. Va. Energy Co., Nos. 080183 & 080182, Civ. Action No. 05-C-85-MJG (W. Va.
May 22, 2008) (5–0 against Massey) (allowing $220 million verdict against Massey to
stand, and in the second vote (3–2 with Benjamin in the minority), issuing a stay pending
application for U.S. Supreme Court review); Timmermeyer v. Goals Coal Co., No.
34138 (W. Va. May 21, 2008) (4–1 against Massey); Brown v. Rawl Sales & Processing
Co., No. 070889, Civ. Action No. 04-C-332 (W. Va. Sept. 11, 2007) (5–0 against
Massey); Ooten v. Massey Coal Servs., Inc., No. 061854, Civ. Action Nos. 02-C-203 &
02-C-232 (W. Va. Jan. 24, 2007) (3–1 against Massey); Birchfield v. Independence Coal
Co., No. 060451, Civ. Action No. 03-C-201 (W. Va. Sept. 13, 2006) (4–0 against
Massey); Am. Mining Ins. Co. v. Lightning Contract Servs., Inc., No. 052364, Civ.
Action No. 04-C-52 (W. Va. Nov. 29, 2005) (5–0 against Massey); McNeely v.
Independence Coal Co., No. 042156, Civ. Action No. 01-C-3 (W. Va. Feb. 9, 2005) (5–0
against Massey)).
211. See id.
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Energizer Bunny of a nonrecusing jurist. He had written three memoranda,
a concurring opinion, and a press release arguing his case.
This last effort put Justice Benjamin’s mistakes beyond his individual
errors and the rights of the litigants. With the March 2009 press release,
he additionally appears to have abused his administrative authority as
chief justice both to file an end-run amicus brief and to make it appear
that the court as an institution supports his decision of nonrecusal. This
is particularly inappropriate in that West Virginia permits each individual
justice to make his or her own decision on recusal with no review by the
full court or any other entity. In other words, each justice is the final and
authoritative word on his or her eligibility to sit on a case. To borrow
Chief Justice Roberts’s well-known—and criticized—analogy to a
baseball umpire, Justice Benjamin and his colleagues get to call their
own balls and strikes.212
This lack of oversight is itself highly regrettable, but common in many
courts, most notoriously the U.S. Supreme Court.213 Such a system is
indefensible—but it should at least carry with it the notion that because
each judge’s recusal decision is individual, a judge’s decision not to
disqualify does not represent the view of the entire court membership,
the court as an institution, or the state in which the court sits. Yet here is
Justice Benjamin individually refusing to recuse and then using the court
as an institution to act as his public relations flack attempting to have
extrarecord impact on a pending U.S. Supreme Court case.
If Justice Benjamin had called Justice Kennedy—who provided the
swing vote in Caperton—to lobby, we would instantly recognize the
wrongfulness of the behavior. Enlisting the state’s supreme court as an
institution in this type of conduct is less dramatic but similarly
troublesome. It reflects Justice Benjamin as overly involved in the
matter and insufficiently neutral and detached. Perhaps most disturbingly, it

212. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78–79 (2008) (relating umpire
metaphor used by Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings and criticizing it as
inaccurate and incomplete); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges
According to Citation Bias (as a Means To Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279,
1279–80 (2007) (noting public relations success of Roberts’s umpire analogy but finding
it misleading and inaccurate); Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV.
183, 187 (2008) (reviewing Posner book); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration
and Legitimization, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 701–05 (2007); see also Honest Justice,
supra note 9 (“Chief Justice Roberts is fond of likening a judge’s role to that of a
baseball umpire. It is hard to imagine that professional baseball or its fans would trust
the fairness of an umpire who accepted $3 million from one of the teams.”).
213. See Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107 (2004); Stempel,
supra note 67.
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misleads in that it suggests that the full court supports his decision not to
recuse. As the merits opinion in Caperton demonstrates, at least 40%
(two dissenting justices) of the court as well as a disqualified member of
the court (Justice Starcher) strongly opposed Justice Benjamin’s failure
to recuse.214
The press release and its underlying study also wasted state resources.
Caperton was already pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. The
empirical “Benjamin Project” trumpeted in the release used court
employee time for something that had stopped being court business—at
least until the U.S. Supreme Court acted—nearly a year earlier, when
Justice Benjamin spurned the third recusal request in early April 2008.
In essence, Justice Benjamin was misusing court resources for his effort
at personal gain, albeit in reputation and result in a pending case rather
than for monetary profit.
Although different courts have different customs, it seems unlikely
that this could have occurred in West Virginia or elsewhere if Justice
Benjamin had not been chief justice. Under the ordinary operating
procedures of most courts, the chief has extensive authority beyond that
of the other judges to direct the institution’s resources. Had he not been
chief, Justice Benjamin probably would not have been able to issue a
self-interested press release in the court’s name. Providing some judges
with these avenues of pleading their case for nondisqualification based
on the accident of the chief justiceship diminishes courts as institutions.
If Justice Benjamin wished to supplement the record regarding his
disqualification decisions, the proper vehicle was his July 2008
concurrence, a vehicle no longer available in March 2009.
IV. WHAT PUNISHMENT SHOULD FIT THIS CRIME?
As Professor Miller’s survey of bad judging and the activity of state
judicial discipline commissions suggest, there seems no shortage of
improper judicial conduct as well as significant, if imperfect, efforts to

214. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 264–65, 284 n.16 (W.
Va. 2008) (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting primarily on the merits but
also critical of Benjamin’s failure to recuse), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); 2 Joint Appendix,
supra note 99, at 453a, 461a–62a (February 15, 2008 Order of Justice Starcher Regarding
Recusal) (noting Justice Starcher’s recusal memorandum and recommendation that Justice
Benjamin also recuse).
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detect and police such misconduct.215 A review of these cases suggests
that judicial discipline efforts have been insufficiently attentive to the
problem of judicial lawlessness and misconduct regarding recusal. For
example, in his article, Professor Miller lists twelve categories of
improper judicial behavior216 and cites examples of its detection and
punishment consuming 242 footnotes.217 Only three of these disciplinary
example footnotes concern judicial “conflict of interest” and
disqualification.218 Although some of the other examples of punishment
for bad judging also touch on Justice Benjamin’s errors in Caperton (for
example, incorrect framing of the legal inquiry, electioneering, and
possible corruption), the Miller presentation is telling and suggests, as
does a broad Lexis search, that judges seldom get into serious trouble for
failing to recuse, no matter how egregious the resistance to disqualification.219

215. See Miller, supra note 8.
216. Id. at 432–33. Miller categorizes the types of judicial misbehavior as:
(1) [C]orrupt influence on judicial action; (2) questionable fiduciary appointments;
(3) abuse of office for personal gain; (4) incompetence and neglect of duties;
(5) overstepping of authority; (6) interpersonal abuse; (7) [racial, gender,
ethnic, or religious] bias, prejudice, and insensitivity; (8) personal misconduct
reflecting adversely on fitness for office; (9) conflict of interest; (10) inappropriate
behavior in a judicial capacity; (11) lack of candor; and (12) electioneering and
purchase of office.
Id.
217. See id. at 433–56.
218. See id. at 450–51.
219. An August 31, 2009 LexisNexis search for cases with “Judicial Conduct” or
“Judicial Discipline” in the case name and mentioning disqualification or recusal produced
only ninety-six citations, many of which were federal court cases involving constitutional
challenges to discipline commissions in which recusal or disqualification was mentioned
only in passing. Another significant subgroup of the database involved states’ enacting a
revised or new judicial code. Only about twenty-five of the cases involved disciplinary matters
in which a primary ground for judicial discipline was failure to recuse or improper
disqualification behavior. Only Arkansas, Nevada, and New York appear to have reported
discipline cases founded significantly on recusal.
However, as discussed below, in disciplinary actions and advisory opinions not contained
in the LexisNexis or Westlaw databases, improper failure to recuse may be the source of
significant admonition or discipline. See infra note 263. For example, the Judicial Investigation
Commission of West Virginia lists nearly 100 “Advisory Opinions and Admonishments”
involving a judicial officer’s failure to recuse from 1994 through March 2009. See JUDICIAL
INVESTIGATION COMM’N OF W. VA., INDEX AND SYNOPSES OF ADVISORY OPINIONS AND
ADMONISHMENTS BY THE WEST VIRGINIA JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, http:/
/www.state.wv.us/wvsca/JIC/advop.htm.
These opinions and admonishments as a whole are generally correct in counseling
recusal in the situations presented and chastising jurists for failing to disqualify themselves
under circumstances requiring their disqualification. To the extent that West Virginia’s
experience is typical, this would suggest that judicial discipline commissions
take disqualification more seriously than case law might initially suggest. However, this
information also provides additional evidence of Justice Benjamin’s error in Caperton.
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From the halls of the U.S. Supreme Court to the local judiciary and
state disciplinary boards, it appears that judges who fail to recuse when
they should seldom face significant consequences or criticism. In
Caperton, the Supreme Court is unwilling to be very critical of even
extreme conduct, with nearly half of the Court seeming to harbor no
concerns over poor recusal practice. A move away from this de facto
professional conspiracy of silence—or at least undercriticism—would be
a welcome step toward improving public confidence. A good starting
point is consideration of possible action against Justice Benjamin.
That Justice Benjamin erred and erred badly should now be viewed as
beyond dispute, notwithstanding the protestations of the Caperton
dissenters, who have proven themselves undue apologists for judicial
wrongdoing. After erring so badly and consistently over so many years,
it would only improperly dilute the force of the Caperton holding if
there were not some adverse consequences to Justice Benjamin for his
pronounced failings. The question then arises: what is an apt response to
Justice Benjamin’s misconduct? What action would appropriately
express the system’s disapproval of his actions, punish him aptly, and
deter him and other jurists from continuing on a path of disqualification
insensitivity?
Potential remedies or punishment for bad judging generally include:
impeachment,220 recusal and disqualification,221 appeal,222 mandamus,223
liability, 224 and discipline. 225 In addition, the efficacy of informal
remedies—judicial colleagues counseling recusal or other restraint—
cannot be discounted,226 although such informal mechanisms were
obviously ineffective in Caperton. Professor Miller also suggests
systematic remedies, such as electoral reform,227 increasing use of merit

There appears to be a legal culture of taking recusal seriously in West Virginia, one that
Justice Benjamin clearly and repeatedly violated.
220. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 15.01–.07; Miller, supra note 8, at 458–60.
221. Miller, supra note 8, at 460–62.
222. Id. at 462–63.
223. Id. at 463–64.
224. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 14.01–.12; Miller, supra note 8, at 464–65.
225. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 13.01–.12; Miller, supra note 8, at 465–69.
226. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U.
P A . L. R EV . 243 (1993) (finding that peer influence directed at improving
judicial performance is significantly effective); Miller, supra note 8, at 465.
227. See Miller, supra note 8, at 469–71.
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selection,228 greater dissemination of information regarding judges,
including published ratings of the judges,229 judicial education,230
expanded grounds for challenging the judge initially assigned to a
case,231 and his own proposed “panel-exclusion approach.”232
This latter cluster of remedies, whatever their merits, do little to
address the instant problem presented by the vacation and remand of
Caperton due to Justice Benjamin’s judicial failings. Electoral reform is
a good idea and will likely be spurred by Caperton.233 So, too, with
revision of methods of judicial selection and recusal reform generally.234
Judicial education sounds nice in the abstract but Justice Benjamin was
repeatedly educated by the Caperton movants as to the correct legal
standard for recusal and yet consistently disregarded or distorted that

228. See id. at 471–74.
229. See id. at 474–77.
230. See id. at 477–79. Professor Miller correctly concludes that improved judicial
education may have limited impact in situations when a judge errs not because of inadequate
knowledge or training but because of psychological orientation or problems. Professor
Miller explains that:
[E]ducation alone cannot solve many of the problems of bad judges. Even
brilliant judges behave badly. Consider former New York State Chief Judge Sol
Wachtler, widely viewed as an outstanding intellect and a superbly qualified jurist.
Few judges were less in need of continuing education than Judge Wachtler. Yet
when a romance with a New York socialite went awry, Wachtler commenced a
disastrous course of conduct resulting in a fall from grace worthy of a
Shakespearian tragedy.
Id. at 479 (footnote omitted).
231. See id. at 479–82; see also Deborah Goldberg et al., The Best Defense: Why
Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 526–34 (2007)
(recommending greater use of peremptory challenges, enhanced disclosure requirements,
per se rules on campaign contributions, referral of recusal decisions to a different judge,
greater transparency, de novo review, easier substitution of judges, and expanded
commentary in the Judicial Code as well as judicial education as a means of alleviating
problem of judges unable to recognize questions as to their impartiality).
232. See Miller, supra note 8, at 482–87 (outlining the panel-exclusion approach,
which operates in a manner similar to the selection of arbitrators under American Arbitration
Association methodology, with parties permitted to strike unacceptable judges coupled
with systematic monitoring to determine the degree to which certain judges are to be
avoided by the parties if possible).
233. See sources cited supra note 24 (regarding the Nevada Judicial Code Revision
Commission’s response to Caperton); see also John Gibeaut, Caperton Capers: Court’s
Recusal Ruling Sparks States To Mull Judicial Contribution Laws, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009,
at 21, 21–22 (noting renewed interest in judicial campaign spending limits or expanded
disqualification based on campaign support in response to Caperton).
234. See Nathan Koppel, Ruling on ‘Probable Bias’ Spotlights Political Reality,
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2009, at A5 (noting increased interest in moving to merit or
appointment selection even while Caperton was pending and noting that Caperton will
add steam to these movements).
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standard.235 In the future, all of these reforms may make another
Caperton case less likely.
As to Justice Benjamin himself, the possibility of electoral remedies is
effectively limited by the timing of West Virginia’s judicial elections in
relation to the Caperton matter and the state’s lengthy terms of judicial
office. When Justice Benjamin was elected in 2004, it was for a twelveyear term and it was in this inaugural election that he received the
benefit of Don Blankenship’s largesse.236 Although those infected
chickens have come home to partial roost, Justice Benjamin still has
almost seven years remaining in his term. Even if the voters want to
throw him out over the Caperton nondisqualification, they must wait
until 2016. And during the intervening eight years, Justice Benjamin
may be able to rehabilitate himself and win reelection notwithstanding
his black eye in Caperton or may elect to retire from the bench.
Electoral feedback thus is likely of limited utility in this case and
certainly of no immediate utility except perhaps through the method of
judicial recall, which exists “in a relatively small number of states,”
West Virginia not among them.237 Under judicial recall, as with the
more common executive recall—perhaps most famously used in recent
times to oust Gray Davis as California Governor and arrange his
replacement with Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2004—a required number
of signatures are collected on a recall petition, engendering a special
recall election through which the judge may be removed from office.238
Notwithstanding progress in the area of public scrutiny and electoral
reform, the fact remains that despite the havoc he has wreaked, Justice
Benjamin remains unscathed except for some modest criticism in the
public arena. Although some of the public opprobrium to which he has
been subjected undoubtedly hurts, Justice Benjamin continues to be
employed as a jurist, with no reduction in salary and no sanction
affecting him personally. Society and the legal system need to

235. However, it may be that insufficient judicial training and consciousness raising
exist today. Judges may be unduly unaware of the cognitive errors commonly made by
people or may incorrectly think themselves largely immune to such errors. See Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Refocusing away from Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to the
Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 335 (2010).
236. See supra Part II.B (describing monetary contributions in Benjamin’s 2004
campaign).
237. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 15.06, at 15-11.
238. See id.

67

figuratively ask whether this is letting off the perpetrator of judicial error
too easily.
Of these case-specific methods listed above, recusal and
appeal/mandamus have already been applied in Caperton, with some
success. Whatever the ultimate outcome on the merits of the tort claims
against Massey, the Supreme Court’s action has accomplished much to
enhance judicial integrity both by removing Justice Benjamin from the
case and spurring considerable discussion in the states regarding reform
of state disqualification law in light of the problems presented by
election aid to judicial candidates.239 However, as discussed throughout
this Article, these corrective measures still leave Justice Benjamin
personally untouched despite the damage he has done. Caperton thus far
offers little incentive for care by judges and implicitly suggests that
judges may push the envelope of nonrecusal very far with the only
consequence being that the judge may ultimately not be able to sit on a
case of interest to a financial benefactor or may receive some media
criticism. This is hardly an effective mechanism for encouraging better
recusal practice by judges.
Civil liability for judges who greatly err regarding disqualification
may be tempting. Justice Benjamin’s pattern of flouting disqualification
law cost the litigants, the legal system, and society millions of dollars.
The Caperton parties’ legal fees alone resulting from the Benjamin
resistance to recusal logically exceed a million dollars in view of the
many hours their expensive attorneys logically devoted to the case.240
All of this could have been saved if Justice Benjamin had performed
even an average job in addressing the recusal question. Forcing him to
pay the bill he imposed on others has a certain element of poetic justice.
But judicial liability for the economic consequences of judicial action
is probably a cure worse than the disease. If judges face civil liability
for their mistakes, the price paid by increased tentativeness and

239. See Gibeaut, supra note 25.
240. As discussed earlier, the recusal aspects of the Caperton litigation extended for
more than three years and involved several motions, two state supreme court decisions
on the merits, seeking of certiorari, and extensive briefing of the case by prominent law
firms of the type that tend to charge $200/hour or more for young associates and up to
$800/hour for partners. The likely result of all this litigation by top-notch, expensive
lawyers is probably seven figures in legal fees for all parties. In addition, there were
seventeen amicus briefs filed, all drafted by attorneys and involving the representatives
of the amici organizations. In addition, of course, the Justices, their law clerks, and other
U.S. Supreme Court staff devoted substantial time to Caperton. This colossal
expenditure of adjudicatory resources and legal fees would have been saved had Justice
Benjamin properly recused himself in October 2005. See supra Parts II–III.
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decreased independence would likely be too much.241 Only if judicial
misconduct exceeds the scope of judicial employment and amounts to an
actionable tort should judges be liable for damages. A judge’s view of
the merits may be colored by the possible financial consequences to a
losing litigant and the judge’s concern regarding the litigant’s realistic
inclination and ability to seek civil remedies should the judge’s order be
reversed.242 Even if the judicial system imposes the requirement of a
finding of egregious error as a prerequisite to civil action against the
judge, there will likely be too much chilling effect if a judge is subject to
civil remedies for financial harm caused to the parties by improper
decisions.
Impeachment, like civil liability, may at first present a seemingly
attractive remedy but on closer examination seems problematic.
Removing a judge is severe punishment.243 Removing a judge due to
recusal error seems excessive punishment for most failures of
disqualification. Although impeachment should not be off the table as a
response to a pattern of repeated judicial recusal error, it should be
reserved for only the most egregious cases in order to avoid politicizing
the process and allowing it to become legislative review of the
substantive merits of judicial decisions.244
241. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (deciding that judge was
immune for ordering seizure of attorney failing to appear for calendar call); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362–63 (1978) (finding that judge was immune from personal
liability for erroneous order sterilizing litigant as punishment for promiscuity; despite
pronounced judicial error, all error occurred within scope of judicial employment and
was subject to immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (noting that judicial
“immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”);
see also ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 14.01–.05; Miller, supra note 8, at 464–65
(discussing liability for errant judges and noting its practical limits due to generally
broad doctrines of judicial immunity as well as prudential limits due to concern over
undue interference with judicial independents).
242. Certainly, this is the long-standing rationale for restrictions on liability for
judges’ conduct within the scope of their judicial duties. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8,
§§ 15.02–.04 (noting drawbacks and potential abuses of impeachment); Miller, supra
note 8, at 464–65. At the risk of departing from this Article’s overall iconoclasm, I find
the traditional rationale largely persuasive.
243. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 15.02, at 15-2; Miller, supra note 8, at 458–
59; Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and Advice
and Consent, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 783 (2006) (suggesting potentially greater use of impeachment
for removing judges and altering composition of judiciary based on broader variety of
grounds than those traditionally employed).
244. See generally ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 15.01–.07; CHARLES GARDNER
GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
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Further, the law and history of impeachment suggest that it should be
used sparingly and usually only for judicial misconduct rather than mere
judicial error.245 Federal impeachment law is limited to “treason, bribery
and other high crimes and misdemeanors.”246 However, many states
permit impeachment not only for criminal behavior by judges but also
“malfeasance or misfeasance in official duties, gross misconduct, gross
immorality, habitual drunkenness, corrupt conduct in office, maladministration,
or incompetence.”247 West Virginia includes “maladministration, corruption,
incompetency, gross immorality, neglect of duty, or any high crime or
misdemeanor” in its criteria that may support impeachment.248
Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse will be viewed by many as mere
judicial error. As the discussion earlier in this Article suggests, I
disagree. The Benjamin nonrecusal was egregious error that resulted
from repeated unwillingness to apply the correct legal standard and

AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 119–25 (2006); Miller, supra note 8, at 459. Miller noted
that “[i]mpeachment inevitably threatens judicial independence,” and that:
Impeachment has value in that it is a well-recognized, traditional method for
disciplining bad judges. If grounded in a constitution, it poses no problems
under doctrines of separation of powers. It is also a high-profile process with
significant opportunities for public participation and input.
. . . [But impeachment] is not a satisfactory solution to the problem of bad
judges [for practical political and logistical reasons].
Id.
Of course, one problem with Justice Benjamin’s recusal error in Caperton was its
extended repetition and his failure to correct his initial mistake. Consequently, one could
argue that even though the recusal error was confined to a single case, it was part of a
pattern and practice of disqualification error. In addition, as admitted by Justice Benjamin
himself in the press release he issued under the auspices of the court, he has participated
in roughly twenty matters involving Massey or an affiliate in spite of having received
$3 million in support from Blankenship. That certainly constitutes a pattern and practice
of improper failure to recuse, even if Justice Benjamin normally voted against Massey in
these cases.
A rational and dispassionate look at the situation might counsel impeachment. But
like everyone else, I have grown up in a legal culture that historically has not impeached
judges for recusal violations. Consequently, it seems too extreme a remedy to me.
245. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 15.03–.04 (noting comparatively rare use of
impeachment in both federal and state systems, with impeachment usually reserved for
instances when a judge is accused of criminal conduct or misuse of office rather than
error in adjudication); GEYH, supra note 244, at 119–25; Miller, supra note 8, at 459–60
(noting modern aversion to politicized impeachment proceedings, such as one directed
toward early nineteenth-century Justice Samuel Chase due to his attempted enforcement
of Sedition Act, as well as instances when impeachment was suggested in obviously
inappropriate cases for political reasons); Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function
Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1791, 1840–42 (1999) (summarizing federal judicial impeachments).
246. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 15.04, at 15-5.
247. Id. (footnotes omitted).
248. W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
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repeated distortion of the situation by an unduly defensive justice
straining to avoid recusal. Recall that Justice Benjamin issued four
separate opinions denying disqualification over more than three years as
well as enlisting West Virginia Supreme Court resources in fighting a
rearguard public relations action attempting to influence the U.S.
Supreme Court in his favor.249 His zealotry in refusing to disqualify makes
this case different from ordinary judicial error for which impeachment is
inappropriate. His repeated application of the wrong legal standard
raises serious questions as to his judicial competence and could support
impeachment in states where lack of competence is a ground for
impeachment. Less charitably to Justice Benjamin, one might also argue
that his conduct in Caperton is circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a finding of malfeasance, gross misconduct, or even corruption.
Under these circumstances, the Benjamin episode presents a far
stronger case for impeachment than most disqualification cases. However,
impeachment is seldom if ever used in cases of judicial incompetence
and usually requires substantial proof of scienter or misfeasance. Justice
Benjamin’s judicial performance has been appalling, but the record to
date does not appear to be able to support a finding of intent to violate
the rules.250 While “Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!” is a political
slogan with some force, it is probably overkill, even in the eyes of
observers like me who find Justice Benjamin’s conduct in Caperton
unconscionable. Hence the question mark following the exclamation
mark in this Article’s title.
The Benjamin episode tempts one to consider the drastic remedy of
impeachment, but the application of the remedy risks too much judicial
independence for more capable judges in return for forcing Justice
Benjamin to bear the consequences of his actions. For similar reasons,
the less common remedy of “legislative address” appears a crude
249. See supra Part III (reviewing protracted history of Justice Benjamin’s refusal
to disqualify in Caperton).
250. Although, he clearly intended his actions, which were violations of the rules.
Further, as discussed above, his repeated error in the face of repeated efforts to at least
make him focus on the correct legal standard regarding recusal pursuant to the Judicial
Code—rather than the higher bar for recusal compelled by the Due Process Clause—
could permit an inference that he did indeed intend to violate the rules and remain on the
case for ulterior motives. See supra Part III. A full investigation of the matter might
reveal some very unpleasant things regarding Justice Benjamin’s motivation and conduct.
But until such evidence is adduced, he of course deserves the benefit of the doubt and a
presumption that his errors were not maliciously intended.
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instrument for addressing the problem in that it functions like
impeachment through a legislative plebiscite regarding the particular
judge but with a broader array of grounds for removal, creating the risk
that a partisan legislature may remove a judge for largely political
reasons, however veiled.251
Judicial discipline, however, seems more than apt for Justice Benjamin.
Without question, he has violated his state’s and the ABA’s codes of
judicial conduct.252 West Virginia, like all states, has a judicial conduct
or judicial discipline commission.253 These entities are generally comprised
of a mix of sitting or retired judges and laypersons, with commission
staff and the power to appoint and compensate attorneys to act as
prosecutors in particular matters.254 The commission responds to complaints
or, based on its knowledge of possible violations, files charges and
adjudicates claims in the manner of a criminal prosecution.255 Evidence is

251. Legislative address usually involves both houses of the legislature requesting
the governor remove the judges. The difference between address and impeachment is that:
[T]he power to remove by address is typically broader than the power to
impeach because the judicial misconduct usually does not have to rise to the
level of an impeachable offense. . . . [In most states with the procedure] a
judge can be removed by legislative address for any reasonable cause, which
need not rise to a level sufficient for impeachment.
ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 15.05, at 15-10 to -11.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 127–29 (discussing Justice Benjamin’s
violations of Canon 3(E)(1) of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and general
canons of judicial ethics).
253. See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; W. VA. R. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY P. 1, 3.
Prior to 1994, West Virginia was in the minority of states with a “two-tiered” structure
for its commission but now has a variant of the common “one-tier” model. See
Structural Changes in West Virginia, California, and Nevada, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Fall
1994, at 6; see also JUDITH ROSENBAUM, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF STATE JUDICIAL
CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (1990) (describing former two-tier structure in West
Virginia).
254. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.01, at 13-2, §§ 13.02–.05 (finding that
judicial conduct commissions are “the primary means by which judicial conduct is
regulated and discipline imposed”); Miller, supra note 8, at 466. Miller notes:
Commission members are drawn from the judiciary, the bar, and the general
public. In some states the judicial conduct commission has only the power to
recommend punishments (other than informal sanctions such as admonishments).
In other states, the commission itself has sanctioning authority. In some cases,
there are two commissions—one to investigate and prosecute complaints, the
other to act in a judicial capacity to determine punishment.
Id. (footnotes omitted). West Virginia’s judicial commission has full prosecutorial and
sanctioning authority subject to the state supreme court. See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 8; W. VA. R. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY P. 4.12; accord IRENE A. TESITOR & DWIGHT B.
SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 12–18 (2d ed. 1980); Structural Changes in
West Virginia, California, and Nevada, supra note 253, at 6 (discussing a variety of
disciplinary remedies in West Virginia).
255. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 13.04–.11.
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taken, normally in a public hearing256 much like a civil or criminal
trial—although generally with reduced due process protections for the
judge under investigation257—and the commission renders a decision258
subject to further judicial review, usually by the state supreme court.259
This method is followed in West Virginia, where the state commission
has broad authority, including jurisdiction to investigate supreme court
justices and to bring its own complaint even if no complainant has filed
charges.260 There thus exists a forum for examining a jurist’s refusal to
recuse in which both judge and critics can present their respective
cases—provided a critic will step forward or the commission is willing
to launch a proceeding on its own initiative.261 Although judicial
discipline for failure to recuse or improper recusal behavior is not
256. See id. §§ 13.12–.12H13-41.
257. See id. §§ 13.09–.11.
258. See id. §§ 13.04–.11.
259. Id. § 13.02. Described in the text is the so-called one-tier system of judicial
discipline, which:
[W]orks within the state court system subject to review by the state Supreme Court,
which is normally responsible for the final disposition of the cases and usually has
de novo review powers. In a two-tier system, a panel, also usually composed of
judges, attorneys, and public members, investigates complaints and files and
prosecutes formal charges (tier one), while a select panel of judges or a special
court adjudicates the formal charges and determines their final disposition (tier
two). Two-tier systems operate independently of the state courts in that they usually
provide for finality at the second-tier, thus precluding Supreme Court review.
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have adopted the one-tier
model while the remaining nine states have opted for the two-tier system.
Id. § 13.01, at 13-2; see also ROSENBAUM, supra note 253.
260. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.01, at 13-2 n.1 (stating that West Virginia
is a state with a two-tier system). The author also notes that: “All state judicial conduct
organizations have jurisdiction over judges of general trial courts, intermediate appellate
courts, and state supreme courts.” Id. § 13.02, at 13-6. See also W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 8; W. VA. R. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY P. 1.11 (listing commission authority over “a
judge”). Rule 2 of the West Virginia Commission clarifies that commission authority
extends to supreme court justices:
Any person may file a complaint against a “judge” with the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel regarding a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The term
“judge” is defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct as “Anyone, whether or not
a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and who performs judicial
functions, including but not limited to Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals . . . .”
Id. R. 2. Accord W. VA. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6, Terminology (West 2008);
O’Brien, supra note 144 (noting that the supreme court administrator referred complaint
about justice to Judicial Investigation Commission).
261. Presumably, if a commission decision were before the full supreme court,
Justice Benjamin would recuse himself from the court’s review—but after witnessing his
performance in Caperton, there is no guarantee.

73

commonplace, it is far from unprecedented,262 especially in West
Virginia.263 Even though there is no overt evidence that the Benjamin
failure to recuse was corruptly motivated, the seriousness of his failings
on the question coupled with his repeated tenacity in failing to comply
with the Code support judicial discipline.

262. See Miller, supra note 8, at 450–51; supra text accompanying notes 220–32
(setting forth additional examples of discipline based in significant part on improper
failure to recuse). See also, e.g., Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline &
Disability Comm’n, 42 S.W.3d 386, 388–91 (Ark. 2001) (admonishing judge for
entering temporary restraining order in favor of Wal-Mart when judge owned $700,000
in Wal-Mart stock and failed to disclose these holdings); Decision and Order Imposing
Public Censure and Barring Judge Sullivan from Receiving Assignments, In re Sullivan,
No. 163 (Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance May 17, 2002), available at http://cjp.
ca.gov/userfiles/file/Censures/Sullivan_05-17-02.pdf (criticizing judge for presiding over
probate matter despite having administered decedent finances, witnessing will, and being
substitute executor); JUDICIAL INQUIRY BD., STATE OF ILL., 1989 REPORT app. f, at 46
(1989), available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summariescomplaints.htm#summ (suspending
judge for failing to disclose that opposing counsel was his business partner); Jose
Arballo Jr., Ex-Judge Censured by Panel, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, May 18, 2000, at B1
(describing in more detail Judge Sullivan’s behavior, including buying a home from the
person whose conservatorship he had processed); Letter from James A. Badami, Executive
Dir., Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, to the Honorable Gayle Ford, Circuit/
Chancery Judge (Sept. 22, 1998), available at http://www.arkansas.gov/jddc/pdf/sanctions/
Ford96.311.PDF (finding violation of code when judge did not disclose leasing office
space to attorney appearing before judge).
263. As previously noted, West Virginia’s Judicial Investigation Commission has
issued scores of opinions or admonishments criticizing jurists for participating in cases in
which they should have recused. These decisions suggest ample precedent for confirming
that Justice Benjamin erred even if they are not determinative of the apt punishment for
the error. See JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION COMM’N OF W. VA., supra note 219 (citing to
matter dated March 23, 2009 (“Commission advised that a judge should recuse himself
from all cases involving an attorney who was the judge’s campaign manager and who
also is a close personal friend of the judge.”); matter dated October 31, 2007 (“[A] judge
should utilize the recusal procedures if one of the parties to a lawsuit involving the
judge’s campaign manager objects to the judge continuing to preside over the case.”);
matter dated April 10, 2006 (“[J]udge should disqualify herself in light of the fact that a
relative of the judge, who was also a witness in the case, had given the judge a purse as
gift while the case was still pending.”); matter dated March 16, 1999 (finding that a
judge must recuse upon request in cases involving attorney who represented judge in
adoption of a child); matter dated December 13, 1995 (“Attorneys appearing before a
judicial officer may serve on that judicial officer’s campaign committee. However, the
judicial officer must disclose this relationship when one of these attorneys does appear
before the judicial officer so that all parties and their attorneys can make an informed
decision [regarding disqualification] . . . .”); matter dated February 19, 1996 (deciding
that ownership of 100 shares of Bell Atlantic stock sufficiently small to be de minimus
within meaning of Code and does not require recusal); matter dated October 14, 1988
(“Improper for judicial officer to sign default in case in which bank in which he or she
owns stock is a party.”)).
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Although the existence and impact of these commissions have
generally been regarded as positive developments,264 they have been
commonly criticized as insufficiently aggressive and unduly friendly
toward judges,265 as well as lacking sufficient resources to consistently
bring necessary claims.266 Conversely, they have also been criticized as
having the potential to be unduly aggressive and “chill the judge’s
exercise of judgment or her ability to control the conduct of litigation”267
in a manner that threatens judicial independence.268 “Moreover, if
sanctions become too severe or the standards for judicial conduct set too
high, good judges may leave the bench in order to avoid the risk of being
penalized for actions taken in good faith and excellent judicial
candidates might be deterred from seeking to replace them.”269
Of particular concern regarding any proceedings against Justice
Benjamin is the risk that judges will be punished simply because a
majority of a judicial commission disagrees with a ruling on the merits
in a case rather than because misconduct exists.270 As in most areas of
law, “the line between these two is not always clear-cut.”271
Undoubtedly, at least four members of the U.S. Supreme Court, seeing
no apparent problem with Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse, would
characterize any discipline as punishing him for his substantive views
concerning disqualification.272

264. Miller, supra note 8, at 466–67 (“[Conduct commissions have] significantly
improved policing against bad judges . . . [and have a] wide range of possible sanctions
[that makes them] able to devise punishments suitable for the offense . . . [with authority
that] extends to the full range of problems of bad judging . . . .”).
265. See id. at 467–68.
266. See id.
267. Id. at 468.
268. Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 65–71 (1998); Miller, supra note 8, at 469; Martin H. Redish,
Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution: A Textual and Structural
Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 674–76 (1999).
269. Miller, supra note 8, at 468.
270. See Lubet, supra note 268, at 65 (explaining that sanctions of judges based on
the substantive merits of the ruling can pose grave threats to judicial independence); see,
e.g., Harriet Chiang, State Commission Drops Charges Against S.F. Judge: Rare Misconduct
Allegation over Judicial Opinion, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 1999, at A1.
271. Miller, supra note 8, at 469.
272. See supra Part II.G (describing Caperton dissenters’ resistance to removing
Justice Benjamin from case and defense of very broad judicial authority to sit on cases
involving large campaign contributors).
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However, as detailed above, Justice Benjamin’s error was not just a
garden variety application of law to facts that may engender
disagreement based on different views of the facts. He consistently
applied the wrong legal standard for years in spite of ample opportunity
to conduct a proper analysis, doing so in a manner suggesting lack of
competence, undue emotional investment in his continued participation,
or perhaps even undue desire to aid a major campaign supporter.273
Although the merits-misconduct line may be fuzzy, some substantive
judicial performance is so deficient as to rise to a level of misconduct
justifying discipline. In addition, so long as the regulatory sanction is
proportionate to the offense and proceedings are not targeted against
particular judges for political or ideological reasons, the danger to
judicial independence appears minimal.
Discipline for violation of former Canon 3(3)(1), now Rule 2.11 of the
ABA Model Judicial Code, could include: private reprimand,274 public
reprimand or censure, 275 required legal education,276 a fine, 277
suspension,278 temporary or permanent reassignment,279 or even removal

273. See supra Part III (assessing and criticizing Justice Benjamin’s performance
regarding recusal in Caperton).
274. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.04, at 13-6; Miller, supra note 8, at 450.
275. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.04, at 13-6; Miller, supra note 8, at 450;
see also, e.g., Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 42 S.W.3d
386, 388–91 (Ark. 2001) (admonishing for failure to disclose investment in litigant); In
re Kinsella, 476 A.2d 1041, 1057 (Conn. 1984) (censuring probate judge for mishandling
estate of incapable person); In re Hart, 849 N.E.2d 946, 949 (N.Y. 2006) (censuring
judge for erring in use of summary contempt power); Arballo, supra note 262.
276. See Miller, supra note 8, at 477–78; see also, e.g., In re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044,
1054 (Nev. 2008) (reversing commission decision of censure and requiring judge to
apologize and obtain judicial education at own expense); In re Mosley, 102 P.3d 555,
558 (Nev. 2004) (censuring judge and requiring him to attend judicial education course
and pay $5000 fine to library).
277. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.04, at 13-6; see also, e.g., In re Mosley,
102 P.3d at 558 (fining judge $5000 for misusing judicial letterhead, arranging release of
arrestee, and delaying in self-recusal from case). A dissenting judge in the case
disagreed regarding the release of the arrestee on own recognizance because there was an
established local custom to do so regularly. Id. at 566–67 (Maupin, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Another judge dissented as to the finding of ex parte communications
and whether the judge had used his position to preside over the matter. Id. at 567 (Rose,
J., concurring in part and dissenting). The final dissenting judge rejected the majority
opinion on the ground that the judge was precluded from presenting proffered expert. Id.
at 567–69 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In the interests of disclosure: I was the expert witness
proffered but not admitted by the commission.
278. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.04, at 13-6; see also, e.g., JUDICIAL INQUIRY
BD., STATE OF ILL., supra note 262, app. f, at 43; Miller, supra note 8, at 450 nn.193–95.
279. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 1.04, at 1-9; see also, e.g., Thomas v.
Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 77 S.W.3d 578, 579–82 (Ky. 2002) (affirming judge’s 180-
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from the bench.280 Although the cases are not legion, there is nonetheless
substantial precedent for removal of judges who improperly fail to
disqualify themselves.281
For the same reasons that impeachment seems overkill, the sanction of
removal seems too harsh even for Justice Benjamin’s misapplication of
the law and unrepentant refusal to admit his ineligibility to participate in
Caperton.282 However, all of the other potential remedies beyond

day suspension for misleading commission regarding amorous relationship, misuse of
office, and ex parte contacts); Miller, supra note 8, at 445 n.142.
280. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.04, at 13-6; see also, e.g., Judicial
Discipline & Disability Comm’n v. Thompson, 16 S.W.2d 212, 222–23 (Ark. 2000)
(removing judge for continuing active practice of law after his election); In re Fine, 13
P.3d 400, 414 (Nev. 2000) (removing family court judge from bench for pattern of ex
parte contacts with litigants, interested parties, and witnesses); Goldman v. Nev. Comm’n on
Judicial Discipline, 830 P.2d 107, 143 (Nev. 1992) (removing justice for willful
misconduct and habitual intemperance and also finding voluntary abandonment of post);
In re Cerbone, 812 N.E.2d 932, 932 (N.Y. 2004) (removing judge for converting funds
from escrow accountant and retaliating against district attorney who made complaint to
commission); In re Roberts, 689 N.E.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. 1997) (removing judge for
pattern of misconduct, including incarcerating individual for eighty-nine days
for contempt without affording due process); Miller, supra note 8, at 450 n.194.
281. See, e.g., In re Romano, 712 N.E.2d 1216, 1216–17 (N.Y. 1999); In re
Murphy, 626 N.E.2d 48, 50–51 (N.Y. 1993); In re Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 1316, 1316–17
(N.Y. 1990); In re Intemann, 540 N.E.2d 236, 237 (N.Y. 1989); In re VonderHeide, 532
N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (N.Y. 1988); In re Myers, 496 N.E.2d 207, 210 (N.Y. 1986); In re
Wait, 490 N.E.2d 502, 503 (N.Y. 1984); In re Sims, 462 N.E.2d 370, 375 (N.Y. 1984);
In re Scacchetti, 439 N.E.2d 345, 345–46 (N.Y. 1982). All of these cases had some
additional judicial misconduct although in several, failure to recuse from cases involving
relatives appears to have been the gravamen of the charge against the judge. By contrast,
Justice Benjamin’s ethically challenged behavior on recusal appears to date to involve
only cases involving Blankenship and Massey. However, I am not insisting that Justice
Benjamin be removed from the bench. I simply think a thorough investigation and some
sanction is in order.
282. Most instances of removal from the bench as a judicial sanction
involve criminal activity or intentional misuse of the office or at least a persistent
pattern of misconduct. See, e.g., In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979) (involving
judge charged with multiple counts of misconduct); In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727
(Mich. 1977) (regarding judge accused of pattern of abusing position); In re Kirby, 354
N.W.2d 410, 421 (Minn. 1984) (regarding judge charged with pattern of improper
disposition of traffic cases, chronic tardiness, and several episodes of intoxication); In re
Fine, 13 P.3d at 414 (removing judge for engaging in repeatedly impermissible ex parte
contacts); In re Corning, 741 N.E.2d 117, 120 (N.Y. 2000) (finding pattern of abuse of
power, lack of judicial temperament, and mishandling of public funds); In re Spector,
392 N.E.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. 1979) (accusing judge of pattern of nepotism and logrolling
regarding hiring for courthouse positions); Currin v. Comm’n on Judicial Fitness &
Disability, 815 P.2d 212, 213 (Or. 1991) (describing judge who regularly decided traffic
violation cases by flipping a coin). Although Justice Benjamin exhibited a repeated pattern
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private reprimand—a figurative slap on the wrist that accomplishes less
than the public scrutiny already surrounding Caperton283—would appear
apt. At a minimum, Justice Benjamin deserves more direct official
criticism for his unrepentant direct violation of the Judicial Code.284 In
addition, his repeated use of the wrong legal standard for assessing his
eligibility to participate in Caperton calls into question his knowledge of
substantive recusal law and suggests that mandatory judicial education is
warranted.285
Perhaps more controversially, a monetary fine and perhaps even a
modest suspension appear to be apt in Justice Benjamin’s case.
Certainly, there is precedent for imposing penalties this severe upon
jurists who have erred less than Justice Benjamin and caused
considerably less collateral damage due to their alleged failings of
compliance with the Judicial Code.286 State judicial conduct commissions
have punished at times for less obviously erroneous or damaging

of misconstruing the legal question surrounding his participation in the case, no pattern of
such behavior across cases has been established. See supra Part III.
283. See supra note 9 (collecting examples of news and editorial commentary
regarding Caperton, many criticizing Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse).
284. See supra Part III (describing why Justice Benjamin’s nonrecusal was
egregiously wrong and why his indignation at being challenged was inappropriate).
285. See supra Part III (describing repeatedly erroneous legal framing of issue by
Justice Benjamin).
286. See, e.g., In re Agerter, 353 N.W.2d 908, 912 (Minn. 1984) (holding
commission could investigate judge over alleged drinking problem and sexual affair); In
re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044, 1054 (Nev. 2008) (ordering judge to attend judicial ethics
education for restraining defendant’s girlfriend for approximately two hours, who had
appeared in his stead, until defendant appeared as ordered for court proceeding); In re
Mosley, 102 P.3d 555, 557–66 (Nev. 2004) (fining, publically reprimanding, and
requiring judge to obtain additional education in judicial ethics even though he, unlike
Justice Benjamin, recused himself in matter involving witness also tied to litigation
involving judge, but viewing this recusal as unduly slow); In re LaBombard, 898 N.E.2d
14, 17 (N.Y. 2008) (affirming removal of judge for invoking status in discussion with
other party involved in auto accident and presiding over case involving step-grandson,
including efforts to ease step-grandson’s punishment); In re Going, 761 N.E.2d 585,
588–89 (N.Y. 2001) (affirming judge’s removal for affair with law clerk and retaliatory
behavior as well as other incidents of erratic behavior and misuse of office to reinstate
friend’s suspended driver’s license); In re Romano, 712 N.E.2d 1216, 1217 (N.Y. 1999)
(removing judge for insensitivity regarding domestic violence and sexual abuse); In re
Bailey, 490 N.E.2d 818, 818 (N.Y. 1986) (removing judge because he conspired to avoid
limits on hunting); In re Hoffman, 595 N.W.2d 592 (N.D. 1999) (suspending judge from
bench for stalking ex-wife); see also In re Lobdell, 451 N.E.2d 742, 743 (N.Y. 1983)
(removing judge from bench for “flouting of the law”); In re Kane, 406 N.E.2d 797,
798–99 (N.Y. 1980) (removing judge due to misuse of appointment powers to aid friends
and family). By way of disclosure, I was proffered—but not received by the
commission—as an expert witness on behalf of Judges Mosely and Assad.
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conduct creating far less damage to the system and to the litigants than
that of Justice Benjamin.287 The same holds true for West Virginia.288
287. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 13.04–.11; Miller, supra note 8, at 450–51;
see, e.g., cases cited supra note 286.
288. See, e.g., In re Cruickshanks, 648 S.E.2d 19, 20–22 (W. Va. 2007) (Benjamin,
J., authoring opinion for court) (affirming magistrate’s suspension without pay for
allegedly retaliating against witness—her son—in criminal proceeding); In re McCourt,
633 S.E.2d 17, 18–19 (W. Va. 2006) (affirming suspension of judge without pay,
pending investigation of sexual misconduct); In re Toler, 625 S.E.2d 731, 734 (W. Va.
2005) (imposing public censure of magistrate, suspending for a year without pay, and
fining $5000 for multiple instances of inappropriate sexual behavior); In re Riffle, 558
S.E.2d 590, 591 (W. Va. 2001) (affirming magistrate’s public censure and suspension for
one year without pay for fraudulent attempt to collect workers compensation benefits); In
re McCormick, 521 S.E.2d 792, 797–99 (W. Va. 1999) (issuing public reprimand of
magistrate for violation of “on call” schedule that deterred domestic violence victims
from coming to courthouse to seek protective orders); In re Tennant, 516 S.E.2d 496,
497–98 (W. Va. 1999) (admonishing magistrate for personal solicitation of campaign
contributions); In re Binkoski, 515 S.E.2d 828, 829–30 (W. Va. 1999) (ordering public
censure of magistrate for driving under influence of alcohol, possessing marijuana, and
encouraging witnesses to be “less than candid”); In re Reese, 495 S.E.2d 548, 549–51
(W. Va. 1997) (admonishing magistrate for failure to avoid appearance of impropriety by
counseling defendant regarding strategy for return of his driver’s license and accepting
gift from defendant’s uncle in return); In re Means, 452 S.E.2d 696, 696–97 (W. Va.
1994) (issuing public reprimand of family law master for having financial and business
dealings with attorney appearing before him); In re Codispoti, 438 S.E.2d 549, 550 (W.
Va. 1993) (holding magistrate should be publically censured for involvement in circuit
judge’s misleading campaign advertisement); In re Eplin, 416 S.E.2d 248, 249 (W. Va.
1992) (suspending magistrate for six months for according “special treatment to criminal
defendant in order to curry favor with state senator”); In re Neely, 364 S.E.2d 250, 251
(W. Va. 1987) (admonishing state supreme court justice for discharging private secretary
who refused to babysit the justice’s infant son when justice had imposed this as job
requirement on approximately a dozen occasions over a year). In Neely, there were two
concurring and dissenting justices—all justices were disqualified and replaced with
circuit judges—who preferred harsher sanction of public censure. Id. at 255.
Certainly, one should not minimize the behavior in these cases that resulted in sanctions. If
anything, many a reasonable observer is likely to regard most of the punishments as
light. For example, in Riffle, a judicial officer engaged in workers’ compensation fraud
and was merely suspended rather than removed. 558 S.E.2d at 591. Nonetheless, bad as
some of the above offenses may be, it is not at all clear that any are worse than Justice
Benjamin’s protracted, repeated, clearly erroneous refusal to recuse that has caused so
much financial and doctrinal cost. Consider Toler, a case in which Justice Benjamin
voted with a unanimous supreme court to impose a $5000 fine and suspend a magistrate
for a year without pay for sexual boorishness. 625 S.E.2d at 733–34.
Magistrate Toler’s conduct was outrageous but appears to reflect the actions of a
libidinously desperate man more than a grave threat to justice, a somewhat less romantic
version of South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford. For example, Toler asked a female
corrections officer “if he could ‘go downtown on her.’” Id. at 735. Toler also offered to
help a divorcing litigant wife, fondled her breast, and “told her he wanted to f**k her.”
Id. However, Toler was also responsible for much more serious behavior that affected
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While one should not minimize the seriousness of the offenses that got
these judges removed from their posts, it is important to keep some
perspective. Nothing is more integral to the American judicial system
than impartiality of the bench. Even minor and quickly passing errors in
failing to disqualify undermine this value. Egregious, repeated errors do
significant violence to the ideal of judicial neutrality. Although harsh
treatment of litigants and lawyers should also be condemned, civility is
no greater value than impartiality. Similarly, use of the bench for
patronage is outrageous—but may do less damage than failure to recuse,
particularly in a case involving tens of millions of dollars and requiring
U.S. Supreme Court correction.289 If the judicial discipline system cares
enough to take action in the cases involving bad temper, insensitivity,
mismanagement, excessively harsh temporary treatment of litigants, ex
parte contacts, and the like, it should also care enough to treat the
Benjamin nonrecusal—which exhibited and continues to exhibit a
pattern of error, insensitivity, and dissembling—with similar seriousness.
Justice Benjamin’s unsupportable decision to deny disqualification
amounts to misconduct and goes to the heart of the judging function and
integrity of the system.
V. CONCLUSION
Reargument in Caperton v. Massey was held before the West Virginia
Supreme Court—without the disqualified Justice Benjamin—on September

the rights of litigants and the adjudication process, rather than just merely displaying
simple boorishness. In one instance, Toler suggested an exchange of a judicial favor for
a sexual favor from another litigant. Id. Another time, Toler kissed a domestic violence
petitioner and asked “if she liked sex and if she was any good at performing oral sex.”
Id. See also In re McCourt, 633 S.E.2d at 18–19 (suspending magistrate without pay,
pending investigation of sexually inappropriate behavior—essentially seeking to view
domestic violence victim naked and fondle her under guise of evaluating her injuries).
Because Toler exhibited a pattern of misbehavior and suggested lack of impartiality
for those who submitted to his sexual overtures, he of course deserved sanction, probably
more severe sanction than he actually received. But was his departure from the impartiality
norm any more severe than that of Justice Benjamin? Although Toler’s misconduct is
more titillating, Benjamin’s almost certainly had greater financial and systemic impact.
Put another way, one might ask whether West Virginia’s judicial discipline system
resembles the worst of a cable news cycle, overemphasizing sexual indiscretion while
underemphasizing more serious events and problems.
289. Criminal behavior by any judge is abhorrent, but Judge Bailey’s scheming
merely to shoot a few more deer is almost comic. See In re Bailey, 490 N.E.2d at 818
(finding that the judge conspired to avoid limits on the number of animals that could be
shot during hunting season). By contrast, the Benjamin failure to recuse has consumed
more than a few game animals during its long march through the judicial system.
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8, 2009,290 with a new decision rendered November 12.291 Perhaps
ironically, the court again found for Massey and obliterated Caperton’s
multimillion dollar judgment, this time by a 4–1 vote. Opponents of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s expansion of due process-based disqualification
may argue that what appears to be the unchanged ultimate outcome of
the long-running Caperton-Massey-Blankenship feud argues in favor of
the position espoused by the Court’s dissenters. But whatever injustices
may have been visited on Hugh Caperton292 in spite of his contribution
290. Argument Docket, W. Va. Supreme Court (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.state.
wv.us/wvsca/calendar/sept8_09ad.htm.
291. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2009 W. Va. LEXIS 107, at
*107 (W. Va. Nov. 12, 2009).
292. The West Virginia Supreme Court’s November 12, 2009 decision is likely to
be the last word on the case because it is based on the court’s construction of a forum
selection clause in a coal supply contract between Caperton’s Harman Mine and a
Massey subsidiary. As such, the court’s decision, no matter how seemingly erroneous it
may seem to some observers (including me), is almost certainly insulated from U.S.
Supreme Court review because it is based on state contract law and procedure and
appears to invoke no federal constitutional questions that might invite further review by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
There remains the possibility that Caperton might file his now seemingly dead case
alleging tortious interference with contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent
concealment in Virginia, although it appears the statute of limitations has run. See id. at
*82 n.37 (“Caperton asserts . . . a remedy [that] may no longer be available in Virginia
due to the running of the limitations period . . . .”). Even if able to proceed in Virginia,
Caperton would face the question of whether his $50 million tort claims are merged with
the $6 million contract claims already adjudicated. See id. at *114 n.48 (noting but
declining to decide issue). At this juncture, it appears that Blankenship and Massey quite
literally “got away with it” in their concerted efforts to drive down Caperton for their
mutual economic benefit. There appears no serious dispute about the West Virginia trial
court’s findings of impermissible misconduct toward Caperton.
Further, the most recent West Virginia decision on the merits hardly gives one
confidence in the judicial system. The court ruled that years of West Virginia litigation,
including trial court findings of impermissibly predatory business behavior causing more
than $50 million of injury, was a nullity because in one aspect of that predation, Massey
had breached a coal sales contract in which Caperton had sought relief in Virginia state
court pursuant to a clause in the contract that provided that “‘[a]ll actions brought in
connection with this Agreement shall be filed in and decided by the Circuit Court of
Buchanan County, Virginia.’” Id. at *10. By a 4–1 vote, the Benjamin-less West
Virginia Supreme Court found that Massey’s extensive efforts to gain control of the
Harman Mine from Caperton were sufficiently “in connection with” the breached coal
sales contract to require that the outcome in the Buchanan County action—a $6 million
victory for Caperton on the contract breach claim—merge into its judgment the claims
that Caperton had advanced in the $50 million West Virginia action. See id. at *48–60.
Just as hard cases may make bad law, perhaps high profile cases implicating judicial
pride make bad law. One can only hope that the West Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision was prompted by some irritation over the U.S. Supreme Court’s interference
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to the jurisprudence of judicial impartiality, the fact remains that his
litigation struck a substantial blow in favor of judicial neutrality. The
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision heightened the legal system’s awareness
of the problems that big money election campaigns pose for judicial
neutrality and is likely to spur reform and improvement, however
tentative and incremental.
Yet the man whose sustained failure of judicial duty brought this
havoc remains largely unscathed and certainly unbowed, almost
irritatingly so.293 He continues to hold high judicial office and has
incurred no discipline for his lengthy, repeated shortcomings as a jurist.
Until this situation is corrected, Caperton’s message to the legal
profession remains muted and provides insufficient incentive for judges
to take seriously their duties of impartiality and judicial competence.
Discipline is in order for Justice Benjamin, its seriousness and
magnitude dependent on the results of disciplinary investigation.
Continued quiescence by West Virginia—and the greater legal
community—only serves to exacerbate the state’s already tarnished
reputation and spreads the stain to all lawyers and judges.

rather than a long-standing commitment to questionable forum selection clause
jurisprudence. If the words “in connection with” are to be interpreted this broadly in the
future with such severe consequences, West Virginians may be in for some unpleasant
surprises whenever they have a dispute with a party with whom they also once
contracted about something tangential to the core of their dispute. The gravamen of the
West Virginia action between Caperton and Massey was whether Massey had engaged in
an impermissible scheme to gain control of the Harman Mine and drive Caperton out of
business. The Buchanan County Virginia action was about the breach of a coal sales
contract. Although the breach was one part of the broad pattern of Massey activity
directed against Caperton, it stretches the notion of “connection” to require that any and
all Caperton gripes about Massey be litigated in a jurisdiction chosen as the site for
hearing disputes over a particular coal sales contract, even if breach of that contract was
part of the overall fabric of Massey’s bad behavior. Although courts routinely give
broad construction to terms like “in connection with,” “arising out of,” or “relating to,”
they seldom demand that a specific contract provision control the location of all disputes
between the contracting parties or those affiliated with them, as occurred on remand in
Caperton. But see id. at *57 (concluding that Caperton’s injuries inflicted by Massey
“flow directly from” Massey subsidiary’s breach of agreement to buy coal from Caperton’s
Harman Mine).
To the extent that the West Virginia Court’s highly questionable, problematic decision
in Caperton resulted in even small part because of the odd history of the case, this is
further ground for treating Justice Benjamin’s recusal failings as serious misconduct that
concretely harmed actual litigants and his own judicial institution as well as the larger
value of judicial impartiality.
293. See supra Part III (noting Justice Benjamin’s lack of apology or admission of
error in response to Court’s removal of him from case in Caperton decision).
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